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I. Introduction: Islam and Immigration in a State of Exception
“Do you agree that the Supreme Court decision in Korematsu does not provide a
legitimate precedent for internment or special registration of individuals who are Muslim or with
ancestry from Muslim majority countries?” This question came during the confirmation hearing
for John F. Kelly, nominated to serve as Secretary of Homeland Security under President Donald
Trump. It is extraordinary but at once strangely normal, a question speaking to a fear brought
forth by a promise repeated by Trump many times on the campaign trail. The questioner, Senator
Gary Peters, asked on behalf of his immigrant and Muslim constituents whether Kelly found
precedent in the World War II internment of Japanese Americans for the mass arrests or
registration of Muslims or immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. If taken at face value,
Kelly’s answer—“I do. I don't agree with registering people based on ethnic or religion or
anything like that. So I think, I would agree with the Supreme Court.”—is at once benign,
comforting, and demonstrative of a concerning lack of awareness of the situation, given that the
Supreme Court in Korematsu had in fact found Japanese internment to be completely legal.1
This thesis deals with the normalization of the extraordinary in the years after the 9/11
attacks. I examine U.S. immigrant and refugee policy and policy discourse, focusing on the
formation of Muslims as particular sites of risk as immigrants in the War on Terror. The most
common figure of the terrorist that emerges after the attacks is of a man who is turbaned and
bearded, pious and irrational, perversely masculine, inevitably penetrative, and, of course,
Muslim.2 In the years that follow, figures of the potential terrorist proliferate for policymakers in
Congress. International students from Muslim-majorities countries studying certain disciplines
are potential terrorists; Muslim refugees from high-conflict areas are potential terrorists; so are
undocumented Pakistani laborers, Sikh men and hijab-wearing women in airports,3 and so on.
These figures of the ‘potential terrorist’ are assessed as risks within a process known as
securitization, by which policymakers deploy a logic of emergency in order to discuss them as
governable only through extraordinary measures.
Securitization, broadly, is a process in which state actors begin to use the language of
security in considering the regulation and governance of a certain policy issue area. Risk
management is a component of securitization that offers tools to assess, quantify, and address
sites of risk, here through biometric and surveillance technologies. A risk assessment of the
figure of the terrorist that emerges after 9/11 discussed above would center on the set of
characteristics identified in that figure that might be used to identify other terrorists. But, as the
securitization of immigrants and refugees effects a proliferation of potential terrorists, the risk
management approach conceives of the terrorist as an incoherent mess of characteristics from
which the only identifier to emerge repeatedly is religion. That is, since each of these figures
securitized as potential terrorist is Muslim or appears to be Muslim, Islam becomes the only
trustworthy indicator of the potential terrorist.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Nomination Hearing:
General John F. Kelly, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security” (2017).
2
See Puar, Jasbir K., and Amit S. Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile
Patriots,” Social Text 72, v. 20, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 117, 118-125.
3
For work on the securitization of the Pakistani labor diaspora after 9/11, see Junaid Rana, Terrifying Muslims:
Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); for work that locates profiling
in airports within U.S. empire, see Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Next
Wave (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); the securitization of international students and of Muslim refugees
are covered in Chapters II and III, respectively, of this thesis.
1
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I argue that the securitization of various figures who are Muslim or are linked to Muslimmajority countries in post-9/11 immigrant and refugee policy and political discourse contributes
to political conditions under which Islam is understood as the only trusted identifier that marks
the potential terrorist. My interest lies in drawing out the mechanics of that narrative: How does
the post-9/11 policy regime form Muslims as subjects? How do policymakers understand the role
of Islam in forming terrorist subjects? How do they configure immigrant and refugee policy as a
means of enabling or preventing terrorist acts? I do not seek to assess the lived experiences of
Muslim migrants who engage in acts of terror, but rather to understand how such experiences
become a sort of text for those who write, debate, and implement policy. Chapters II and III of
this thesis explore two instances of the securitization of figures who are Muslim or presumed to
be Muslim. In the final chapter, I turn to that which I suggest is a realization of the logic that
treats all Muslims as risk, the Trump executive orders heavily restricting immigration from
Muslim-majority countries, and document the judicial contestations that followed.
My argument draws from two broad theoretical conversations, neither particularly
demarcated nor well-defined. One is the meeting point of the various subsets of political science
known as critical security studies, international political sociology, and surveillance studies.
Scholarship in these fields deals with the rise of the logics of exception and emergency in policymaking, specifically dealing with the processes by which different policy sectors become
governed in the language of security. A component part of these shifts is the rise of mass
surveillance and biometric technologies as tools to ‘solve’ security threats. The second body of
scholarship from which I draw deals with religion and race after 9/11. Reaching across and
between disciplines, these scholars seek to understand how 9/11 altered and did not alter
political, cultural, and social treatments of race and religion. I am most interested in
commentaries on the formation of Islam and Muslims in the post-9/11 moment, a subject that has
prompted much debate in regards to the racialization of religion, the treatment of religious
behaviors in policy, and the discourses of colorblindness or race-neutrality and of freedom of
religion. In conjunction with these two theoretical conversations, I reference a number of works
on the history of immigration and refugee policy in the United States, along with critical studies
in immigration more generally.
1. Securing the border, securitizing immigration
Conversations about border security and homeland security must begin with the
conversation of what, exactly, entails securing borders and securing the homeland. The logics of
insecurity and security were not always used to describe such abstractions as the border, much
less the homeland. Scholars of security studies and international political sociology argue that the
gradual extension of the language and policy structures that constitute security to borders and the
homeland can be described as ‘securitization.’
Loosely defined, securitization is the process by which things that are not implicitly
related to national security become addressed through the language and logics of national
security. Ole Wæver, the scholar of international relations who first formulated the idea of
securitization, suggests that security be understood as a “self-referential practice.” Wæver and
those in the Copenhagen school of international relations tend to disagree with the normative
conception of security as a matter of ontology. Normative theorists of international relations
prefer to understand security as a constrained and unchanging field, such that security constitutes
only the field of political relations between states that are organized around violence. For
Wæver, security is better defined as the result of “political choice[s] on how to tackle an issue”
2

by which actors frame a given political topic in the language of urgency in order to accomplish
certain outcomes. Security becomes the field of politics that stands apart from ‘normal’ politics.4
The mechanics of defining that which is security politics from that which is normal
politics rests on securitization acts. An act of securitization, for Wæver, includes four
components: the securitizing actor, the object labeled as threat, the object referred to as under
threat, and the audience who is meant to perceive threat. The securitizing actor labels something
an existential threat in order to “clai[m] a right to handle it with extraordinary means.” Wæver
frames securitization as almost entirely elite-driven, with political authorities generally taking the
role of securitizing actor that seeks to convince the body of citizens of the need for security
politics. To render a political issue as security politics requires a series of speech-acts: per
Wæver’s gloss of J.L. Austin, “by speaking something is done.” Thus securitization theory draws
attention to verbal and written texts produced by political elites aimed at broad audiences.5
Securitization theory functions here as a means of rendering legible the work of the
politics of exception and, to a lesser degree, the biopolitical functions of immigration policy. In
this sense I aim to uncover the architecture behind that which Didier Bigo names the “banopticon.” This term, which plays on Foucault’s reading of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and
Agamben’s theory of the sovereign ban, offers a neat encapsulation of Bigo’s approach: he bring
together political theorists from separate but related disciplinary conversations to analyze
complex relations of power in contemporary society. Bigo and his contemporaries draw
especially from Foucault’s work on biopolitics and population management, the Schmittian and
Agambenian theories of exception, and Agamben’s formulation of the homo sacer. Bigo’s banopticon does so in describing the post-9/11 surveillance of certain minority groups:
The Ban-opticon is then characterized by the exceptionalism of power (rules of emergency and
their tendency to become permanent), by the way it excludes certain groups in the name of their
future potential behavior (profiling) and by the way it normalizes the non-excluded through its
production of normative imperatives, the most important of which is free movement... This Banopticon is deployed at a level that supersedes the nation-state and forces governments to
strengthen their collaboration in more or less globalized spaces, both physical and virtual,
sometimes global or Westernized, and still more frequently Europeanized.6

My interest lies primarily with the ways in which the exceptionalism of power is deployed to
exclude minority groups through profiling. As I show below, the definition of immigration
policy as security politics produces immigrants as security concerns, particularly affecting
Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In this sense, I aim to sketch out the discursive and
policy mechanisms by which U.S. immigration policy constitutes the ban-opticon.
I quote at length from Bigo’s work on the ban-opticon here in part because this summary
acts as an excellent theoretical overview of the rest of this chapter and in part to stake out my
relation to Bigo’s approach. Bigo and many of the scholars writing in the field of international
political sociology approach post-9/11 security studies from the European perspective, given
Wæver’s location in Copenhagen and Bigo’s own Paris School of security studies. As the
language from the quote above might suggest, international political sociology draws from
continental philosophy in making sociological and anthropological arguments about the
international system. In adopting the securitization paradigm to deal with Congressional
Ole Wæver, “What Is Security?,” in European Security 2000, ed. Birthe Hansen (Copenhagen: Copenhagen
Political Studies Press, 1995), 226.
5
Wæver, “What Is Security?,” 226-227.
6
Didier Bigo, “Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon,” in Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal
Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, ed. Dider Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 35-6
4
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discourse about immigrant and refugee policy, however, my approach takes a slightly less
sweeping scope in that I deal with the mechanics of the policy process within the United States.7
Andrew W. Neal, writing in the tradition of Bigo, argues that political realizations of the
state of exception such as the ban-opticon function within historical structures of power. Neal
argues that Foucault points to a need for theorists of exception to go beyond “describ[ing] a
special category” of political action. Rather, Neal calls for scholars “to stress that successful and
mobilizing declarations of exceptions are only possible because of an already existing discursive
formation of objects, subject positions, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies.”8 I read
Neal as a reminder to historicize the state of exception, which I will attempt to do in sketching
out two moments in the pre-9/11 history of U.S. immigration policy that deal with the
construction of the border and the homeland as issues of security.
2. Historicizing homeland security
In June 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the National Security ExitEntry System (NSEERS) by describing a “new war” in which “our enemy's platoons infiltrate
our borders, ...mov[ing] unnoticed through our cities, neighborhoods, and public spaces.”9
NSEERS functioned as a tracking program for all noncitizen men over the age of 16 from
twenty-five countries, all but one of which were Muslim-majority. NSEERS resulted in over
13,000 deportations; none of those deported were charged with terrorism-related crimes.10
Ashcroft deploys the language of emergency to justify the incredibly invasive system of profiling
that NSEERS represents, a system that would prove to be ineffective in accomplishing the goals
of policymakers. In declaring such an ambitious and technologically advanced program,
Ashcroft brought immigration restrictionism into a new age, but he drew on well-tried scripts in
describing it to the world: as Neal observes, declaring a need for exceptional politics in order to
secure the homeland demands certain pre-existing configurations of power.
Stated otherwise, to historicize homeland security is to engage in “an analysis of how [the
racist state] is able to do what it does” after 9/11, as Dylan Rodriguez puts it. This demands “a
focal attention to the historical conditions of possibility for the current institutional formations of
migrant criminalization and immigrant detention.” 11 The history that follows is not necessarily a
history of the securitization of immigration,12 but rather an attempt to call attention to the
‘conditions of possibility’ for that which I study in this thesis.

See Didier Bigo, “International Political Sociology,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul Williams, 2nd
ed (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013), 120–33; for an example of an approach closer to that which I attempt
here, see also Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order, Security and
Governance Series (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England] ; New York: Routledge, 2011), 7 ff.
8
Andrew W. Neal, “Foucault in Guantánamo: Towards an Archaeology of the Exception,” Security Dialogue 37,
no. 1 (March 2006): 44.
9
United States Department of Justice, “Announcing the National Security Entrance and Exit Registration System”
June 6, 2002, http://web.archive.org/web/20031209053648/http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/060502
agpreparedremarks.htm.
10
Penn State University’s Dickinson School of Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights, “NSEERS: The Consequences
of America’s Efforts to Secure Its Borders” (Penn State University, March 31, 2009), 11.
11
Dylan Rodríguez, “‘I Would Wish Death on You...’: Race, Gender, and Immigration in the Globality of the U.S.
Prison Regime,” The Scholar and Feminist Online, Borders on Belonging: Gender and Immigration, 6, no. 3
(Summer 2008), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/immigration/print_drodriguez.htm.
12
Though this is primarily a question of method: since I attempt a structural overview not focused on speech acts
and security politics, I cannot claim to investigate securitization in the sense of Wæver.
7
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The Immigration Act of 1924 instituted the first federal regime of race-based immigration
restriction. The infamous ‘national origins quota,’ designed to preserve the ethnic makeup of the
early twentieth century United States, limited all immigration to 150,000 people annually,
divided according to predetermined ratios based on nationality. Entry from each country was
limited to 2% of the foreign-born population from that country residing in the United States
according to past Census data. The Immigration Act of 1924 also incorporated the Asian
Exclusion Act, which banned all immigration from Asia. The 1924 Act expanded on a short-term
quota measure passed in 1921 and several state-based immigration restrictions that used nation
of origin bans.13
Mae Ngai argues that the Immigration Act of 1924 created “a new sort of state
territoriality” in instituting such a race-based immigration regime. In effect, this was the first
time that immigrants in the United States could be sorted by authorized or unauthorized entry,
with unauthorized entrants becoming a “social reality and legal impossibility.” The Act of 1924
rendered certain populations within the United States illicit by their very presence. Such
populations were defined in terms of race, in and of itself not particularly new were it not for the
linkage of race to the specific geography of the border.14 Ngai’s analysis offers an important
touchpoint in the use of racial panic to configure the border as exclusionary. While the racial
origins quota system of the Immigration Act of 1924 was removed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1965, which favored family reunification and the entry of those with
educations, the systemization of territoriality and il/legality remained.
The end of the twentieth century saw a similar emphasis of the border in policy
conversations about immigration. The free-market border politics of the Reagan era prompted
pushback from anti-immigrant constituencies in states on the southern border in the late 1980s
and 1990s, especially California and Texas. State legislatures began to implement harsher
policing policies in cities near the border. In some states, ballot measures implemented
increasingly harsh restrictions on access to public services for undocumented immigrations, such
as California’s Proposition 187 in 1994. By 1990, policymakers with explicitly restrictionist
agendas took leadership roles in the immigration committees of national House and Senate. The
policy shifts that followed in that decade, most notably the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), increased funding to the policing of the
southern border, instituted a strict deportation regime, and reduced the rights of unauthorized
immigrants. For the most part, the rights and access of so-called ‘high-skilled’ immigrants were
left untouched.15 Often, policymakers explained the difference of regulation by relating
unauthorized entry to criminal activity or drug trafficking, thus justifying the militarization of the
southern border through the mobilization of moral panic.16
The expansion of immigration restrictionist policies in the 1990s drew from and radically
expanded the idea of the border as permeable and in need of intervention. IIRIRA and its statelevel equivalents engaged in the “symbolic act of claiming the border inside [the state’s]
territorial boundary” such that any people observed representing the border as permeable are

13

Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, Princeton Studies in
American Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002), 139-149.
14
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2014), 105, 115.
15
Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 274-285.
16
Mehnaaz Momen, “Are You a Citizen?: Insights from Borderlands,” Citizenship Studies 9, no. 3 (July 1, 2005):
325-326.
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interpreted as threat.17 Indeed, Lisa Marie Cacho observes a metonymy of immigrant and
criminal articulated specifically against Latinx people at the height of the panic over
unauthorized immigration at the southern border. Cacho notes the emergence of rhetoric that
produces “illegal alien... as de facto status crime,” under which ‘de facto status crime’ is the
presumption of future or past criminality based on (often racialized) markers of status.18 In this
regard, the policies enacted on the southern border helped produce that which Nathalie Peutz and
Nicholas de Genova name the deportation regime, under which the relatively ineffective, costly,
and limited act of deportation exerts less violence than deportability, “the protracted possibility
of being deported [and]... the multiple vulnerabilities that this susceptibility for deportation
engenders.”19
Most studies of the securitization of immigration agree that the attacks of 9/11 acted as a
focusing event, to use Waever’s language, for the expansion of security logics. In his extensive
study of political and theoretical responses to the 9/11 attacks, Talal Asad names homeland
security as “the new epistemic community being called for [as] necessary to name and deal with
what is claimed to be a new object in the world of liberal democracy—terror.”20 For Asad, the
post-9/11 apparatus is only new in that it reorients the mechanisms of state control against a new
object, terror, and toward regulating those populations associated with terror. The homeland
security regime is the product of this reorientation: it actualizes the idea of ‘threat to the
homeland’ as a new political terrain in which to chart action, though such actions might not be
particularly unique. Indeed, Chebel d’Appollonia suggests that the idea of homeland security
relies on the “convergence of... comparable objectives” with the border security regime. Namely,
policy actors are able argue for the goal of “strengthen[ing] border controls and expulsion
policies” through the interlocking claims of securing the border, screening for terrorists, and
“polic[ing] minorities at national and local levels.”21
The act of securing the homeland relied upon and reproduced many of the tropes used in
securing the southern border. Many politicians and commentators who described the threat
presented by certain Muslims made clear that they were only concerned with the “bad” Muslims,
not the “good” ones. The writing of “bad Muslim” as terrorist and illegal entrant and “good
Muslim” as patriot drew upon the scripts of the previous decades that separated “bad
immigrant,” a figure who is undocumented and criminal, from “good immigrant,” who
assimilates and pays taxes.22 Indeed, the language of immigrants threatening national security
was mobilized not only against Muslims and people who looked like Muslims but against Latinx
immigrants as well. The reinvigorated trope of “invaders from abroad,” which had fallen out of
use with the rise of the discourse of colorblindness, found greatest strength when leveraged in
Momen, “Are You a Citizen?,” 332.
Lisa Marie Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (New
York: New York University Press, 2012), 43-44.
19
Nathalie Mae Peutz and Nicholas de Genova, “Introduction,” in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and
the Freedom of Movement, ed. Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Mae Peutz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2010), 14; see also Victor Talavera, Guillerma Gina Nunez-Mchiri, and Joisah Heyman, “Deportation in the U.S.Mexico Borderlands: Anticipation, Experience, and Memory” in The Deportation Regime.
20
Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, Wellek Library Lectures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 29.
21
Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and Europe: How Does It Feel to
Be a Threat?, Europe in Transition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
22
Cacho, Social Death, 99-107; Sunaina Maira, “Deporting Radicals, Deporting La Migra: The Hayat Case in
Lodi,” Cultural Dynamics 19, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 42, 56-58; Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim:
America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, 1st ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 15-16.
17
18
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through the “purportedly race-neutral language of cultural conflict” represented by multiple
immigrant communities.23
Several distinguishing characteristics separate the securitization of immigration under the
homeland security from the previous shifts in territoriality and border security noted above. First,
the use of air transportation in the 9/11 attacks in a sense extended the perceived threat of border
violations across the entirety of the United States. Second, the immigrant population defined as
threatening was described in terms of religion, Islam, rather than by nation of origin or broad
racial designation (more on this later). Finally, technology was simply more advanced than ever
before. Security technologies were certainly of interest to the U.S. government before 9/11, both
at the border and elsewhere, but the moments after the 9/11 attack represent the most significant
adoption by government agencies of certain emerging technologies. The use of such technologies
to identify terrorists and those who might be terrorists is a key component of the securitization of
immigration after 9/11.
3. Risk management and risk technologies
The post-9/11 securitization of immigration manifested immediately in the use of the
risk management approach in policymaking, a key component of which is a heavy reliance on
the use of advanced security technologies. Risk management has its roots in the corporate world,
where it serves to maximize the completion of business goals and return on capital investment.
The use of risk management in policymaking maps onto the political moment that security
scholars label the transformation of risk: intensifying globalization and increasing securitization
of traditionally normal political issues shifted the role of risk in security analysis from external
and calculable to uncertain, incalculable, and manufactured in part by a greater systemization of
knowledge. That is, technological advances not only enable increased levels of knowledge about
the world but also prompt a similar increase in variables to consider in making decisions, and
therefore in a greater awareness of that which is unknown or uncertain.24
Benjamin Muller argues that the threat of terrorism after 9/11 leads to the “preassessment of risk” as a policy tool under the “regime of risk management.” Risk management
rests on the understanding that all failures are catastrophes and unmanageable, and as such for
this approach failure must therefore be avoided at all costs by removing any risk. (One might say
that this is a less a question of risk management as it is one of managing to avoid risk.) When
applied to borders and border security, it follows, risk management assumes “that all individuals
are potential risks,” leading to a focus on “avoiding risk rather than effective mitigation and
resilience.” To assess an individual’s potential for risk requires certainty over that person’s
identity. 25 In this sense, risk management requires a fascination with identity, in that it demands
that an individual be able to verify their identity in order to be cognizable by the risk
management apparatus.
Technology proves to be the most effective tool of securing identity. Risk technologies
include biometric and surveillance technologies. Technically, ‘biometrics’ refers to any
measurements of unique human characteristics. The most common usage of the term refers to
23

Ian Haney-López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the
Middle Class (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 121.
24
Ayse Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security: Management of Uncertainty and Risk in the Age of Biometrics,”
Surveillance & Society, Smart Borders and Mobilities, 5, no. 2 (2008): 105-107.
25
Benjamin Muller, Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies, PRIO New Security
Studies (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 58, 60-61.

7

physical characteristics: in this case, biometric technologies can measure facial features,
fingerprints, the irises and retinae of the eyes, and so on. Biometric technologies differ from
other forms of identification, such as a visa, because the identifiers that they track are unique to
each individual.26 Surveillance technologies encompass a far broader range of tools, from those
that record an individual’s movement through their mobile devices to the practice of compiling
data about a person’s body from multiple different sources to create a comprehensive profile.27
Risk technologies are not value-neutral and, in the hands of a state that has constructed a
security apparatus against a particular group of people, are potentially quite harmful. Take, for
example, a hypothetical contract between a security agency and a software firm. The security
agency requests that the firm develop a program to take in large sets of profiles, for which each
profile consists of a number of attributes, and filter out profiles that have certain characteristics.
The purpose of the program will be to sort through data submitted on visa applications to sort out
‘risky’ applicants for further, more rigorous screening. However, the agency does not inform the
contractor about the specific use of the program, citing national security as a reason to keep
details vague. The agency asks that the program use a machine learning algorithm: that is, the
program will determine which characteristics should decide filtering based on a base set of
profiles; the program will update the characteristics that decide filtering every time a new profile
is filtered.
In this hypothetical, when the agency compiles the base set of ‘risky’ profiles (those that
the program uses to determine which characteristics should decide filtering), agency members
select a disproportionate number of profiles with the characteristics ‘Iraqi,’ ‘bearded,’ and so on.
The initial program will initially be biased toward identifying as ‘risky’ the profiles of bearded
Iraqis. As it learns from identifying ‘risky’ profiles, however, the program will update its list of
characteristics that indicate risk from an even larger skewed set of profiles, making the bias more
pronounced. The agency members handling the use of the program might not be trained to
identify the algorithmic bias at work and the contractors might not be hired to maintain the
program, allowing the skewed identification process to continue unquestioned.28
Risk management technologies track physical characteristics and biometric identifiers,
but they are unable to evaluate those characteristics that are not physiological in nature. Despite
this, intangible characteristics are not isolated from logic of risk management, which seeks to
quantify and make certain all potential vectors of risk. Talal Asad notes that liberal political
subjects who deal with the idea of terror exert a fascination with motive. According to Asad,
motive describes not the reasons why someone does something, but rather to the intangible
epistemological conditions that give meaning to a person’s action. Motive is intensely personal,
but becomes an issue of concern when linked to behaviors that are considered deviant or
incognizable (Asad deals with suicide bombing). In the language of risk, Asad’s note that “we
ask for an explanation in terms of motive only when we are suspicious of what [an] action
means”29 indicates the frustrations of the risk management apparatus in assessing actions that
cannot be explained through analysis of physical characteristics.
Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security,” 104.
For an excellent overview of contemporary surveillance technologies and their role within U.S. law, see Rachel
Levinson-Waldman, “Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government
Surveillance in Public,” Emory Law Journal 66, no. 3 (January 2017): 534-549.
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While risk management technologies can determine identity through physical markers,
motive cannot be analyzed. Risk management renders the biometric body “a readable text
composed of signs and codes,” as Ayse Ceyhan puts it, but in doing so “de-links [the body] from
consciousness and subjectivity.”30 The state that seeks to prevent terror through the preemptive
assessment of risk, then, mistrusts motive and affairs of the consciousness, those intangible
things that resist quantification. In the case of post-9/11 policymakers legislating on terror, the
divide between measurable physical characteristics and the intangible realm of motive tends to
be articulated in terms of race and religion. The risk management apparatus can conceive of race,
given the inextricability of race and body, as well as the epistemic link of race and nationality.
Religion, however, is less easily cognizable, belonging squarely within the realm of intangible
motive. The confusion of a risk management apparatus that must treat religion as an identifier
but struggles to do so produces continually innovative formations of race and religion.
4. Religion, race, terror
The securitization that I deal with here enacts through risk management an imbrication of
religion, race, and terror in the immigrant subject. I must reiterate that I am not interested in the
role that religion plays in forming the terrorist subject. Rather, I am interested in the ways that
policymakers conceive of the role the religion plays in forming the terrorist subject and conceive
of using immigration and refugee policy to block terrorist entry. My argument treats Islam as the
primary identifier of the terrorist in policy discourse, though this is often mediated through the
lenses of national origin or race. The anti-Muslim policies of the Trump administration, as I
suggest in my final chapter, represent a realization of these logics, by which a risk management
approach defines all Muslims as potential terrorists and therefore necessary targets of
exclusionary policy-making.
A number of contemporary scholars of religion and race, such as Jasbir Puar, Junaid
Rana, and Leerom Medovoi, argue that the homeland security regime effects a racialization of
religion. They argue, generally speaking, that racial characteristics become associated with and
indicative of religious identity, especially for federal, state, and local agents tasked with policing
through profiling. For Puar, religious identity is rendered racial when filtered through the
regulatory apparatuses of risk management, profiling, and population control. Medovoi and Rana
point instead to the long histories by which European countries and the United States have
deployed racial configurations of religious bodies in the maintenance of state power.
The meeting point of risk management technologies, as discussed above, and the bodycentered practice of racial profiling after 9/11 draws out the ways in which Islam becomes an
identity of skin color and bodily marking. Puar argues that “the manufacture of Muslim as race”
follows the confusion of “the statistical informational ontologies deemed ‘Muslims’ and those
that begin to bleed into ‘terrorist’” in the post-9/11 moment. The collection of data at a mass
scale through biometric and surveillance technologies enables security analysts to abstract and
render similar data collected on those who are algorithmically Muslim—that is, assumed to be
Muslim due to ethnicity or nation of origin—and those who have committed acts of terrorism.
For Puar, this is an inevitable result of the state’s “dance between the profile that is racialized
and the racial profile” in which “data collection enables a mapping of race... [by] establish[ing]
the individual as imbricated in manifold populations.”31 The bodily practices of racial profiling
Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security,” 118.
Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Next Wave (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2007), 160-162. See also Sangay Mishra and Jinee Lokaneeta, “Subjects of ‘Suspicion’: Racial Profiling of
30
31
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link these technologized abstractions of human bodies to physical characteristics once again,
rendering ‘Muslim’ a race in the sense of the data body and the detained body.
The 9/11 attacks do not represent the first moment that Muslims in the United States
enter the public eye and therefore cannot represent a sort of initial point of racialization. Rana
and Medovoi take similar approaches in discussing pre-9/11 forms of Islamophobia to shed light
on its contemporary forms. Medovoi reads together the long history of the European
politicization of Islam and Judaism to argue that the confluence of the two is a “generalized antiSemitism” that he labels “dogma-line racism.” Compared with racism based on physical
characteristics, Medovoi’s dogma-line racism understands threat as the “ideologically motivated
enemy” who “actively seek[s] to infiltrate and destroy” those in power.32 In Rana’s treatment,
Islam functions as the specter of the times, whether it be “Saracens, Moors, Turks, Orientals,
Arabs, Africans, Asians, Jews, Indians, Muselmann,” revived by white Europeans and U.S.
Americans whenever white supremacy comes under attack. Rana argues that the ‘racing’ of
Islam takes places within the context of specific formations of racism such as anti-Blackness,
anti-Semitism, and, in the present context, racism against people of Arab or Middle Eastern
descent.33
Fewer scholars have centered on state articulations of Islam as a religion within the realm
of security policy. Rosemary Corbett calls for a re-accounting of the racialization framework
through a reading of history similar to that provided by Medovoi and Rana. Corbett suggests that
policy-makers do not treat religion exclusively as a race but rather center on “the irrational
religious fanatic of whatever race or nation resists modernity and is given to passionate irrational
attachments,” effecting a “religionization of race.”34 A generous reading of Corbett might place
her argument as following Asad’s notes on motive, discussed above. Certainly irrationality and
resistance to modernity might act as factors of which the risk management apparatus is unable to
conceive. A less generous reading might question Corbett’s assertion of policies that center on
‘religious fanatics of whatever race or nation’ given the thoroughly Christian or at least postChristian language deployed in writing Islamophobia into law. Mahmood Mamdani’s excellent
formulation of “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” may offer assistance here: if Islam is
described in the language of ‘culture talk,’ as Mamdani asserts, the state divides Muslims
according to the rubrics of secularity, rationality, and modern ethics.35
I aim to sketch out a claim in the following pages that both acknowledges the reality of
racialization and points to the consistent discursive animus towards Islam as a religion. Many of
the policies that I discuss here deploys nation of origin as a differentiating factor in the
implementation process, an act of discrimination to which certain agencies have right in cases
that relate to national security. In some cases, profiling on the basis of race or nation of origin is
tacit, undertaken by federal agents following internal and confidential communications. As I will
Muslims, South Asians, and Arabs in the Post-9/11 U.S,” Conference Papers -- American Political Science
Association, no. Journal Article (2012): 1–39.
32
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(June 1, 2012): 67-68.
33
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34
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show, the language that motivates these racialized and racializing policy moves is that of
religion. Members of Congress routinely invoke Muslims when speaking about security threats,
most often through references to jihad, radical Muslims, and al-Qaeda. It is fear of the bad
Muslims that effects a suspicion of all Muslims. Indeed, I turn to the realization of these logics in
Chapter IV, which considers the actions taken by the Trump administration to ban the entry of
Muslims into the United States. I suggest in this chapter that the overt anti-Muslim language of
the Trump campaign and administration may offer a point of intervention through the religion
clauses of the U.S. Constitution. If it is anti-Muslim discourse that has brought about the
racialization of Muslims, perhaps the contestation of anti-Muslim discourse will contribute to the
slow untangling of racial stereotypes from Muslim lives.
5. Notes on methods
I focus my primary source analysis less on immigration and refugee policy than on the
conversation that surrounds policy. I use policy broadly to refer to legislative documents,
executive orders, agency programs, and judicial decisions. My main area of interest lies with the
Congressional debates, hearings, and other deliberative processes that inform U.S. political
decision-making. My approach here is rooted in the understanding that language, spoken and
written, constitutes a means for political institutions to conceptualize action. The United States
Congress acts to produce policy but it must first seek political meaning, a deeply complicated
process in which Congressional hearings and debates play a role. The archive of Congressional
discussion and debate shows the processes of institutional meaning-making.
As such, I analyze transcripts of Congressional debates, Congressional reports, written
submissions to Congressional hearings, transcripts of verbal submissions to Congressional
hearings, and recordings of Congressional hearings. In a Congressional hearing, expert witnesses
are invited to speak and then questioned by committee members. They allow “committee
members and the public [to] hear about the strengths and weaknesses of a proposal.” The
committee chair determines which bills will receive a hearing, though hearings are sometimes
convened independent of a specific policy proposals.36 Committee hearings function within the
authority of Congressional agenda-setting: the party that has a majority in the House decides the
legislative landscape of the House; the majority party of the Senate does so for the Senate. In this
sense, hearings shape the political discourse of Congress by determining what outside voices are
centered in legislative discussions and the manner with which expert witness are engaged.
I do not mean to suggest that everything a person says in Congress affects policymaking
or acts as a reference point for national conversations about policy. Nor do I mean to extract a
coherent narrative from discussions that are anything but. Rather, I see the ideas introduced in
the Congressional archive as a sort of exploration. Some ways of thinking might find a hold
beyond the scope of a debate and some might not. In doing so, I follow Neal’s call to frame
securitization in ways that decenter elite- and state-based analysis. Neal argues that securitization
is best conceptualized within the field of security politics, such that scholars acknowledge that
“security does not simply involve the decisions of sovereigns or expansive techniques of
government, but mobilizes and engages politicians in diverse ways.” I aim to understand
securitization as dynamic, iterative, and produced in the conflicts and agreements between

Congress.gov, “The Legislative Process: Committee Consideration,” accessed November 14, 2016,
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politicians.37 In this sense, every voice in the policy process matters for this sort of discourse
analysis: tracking the growth of an idea from the periphery to the mainstream often requires
paying attention to those policy actors who would be otherwise ignored.
6. Structure of the thesis
In Chapter II, I explore the expansion of the biometric state in 2002 and 2003, as effected
through a fear of terrorists entering the United States on student visas and the imposition of risk
management technologies on the system of entry for international students. One of the nineteen
9/11 hijackers entered on a student visa, though he did not list a sponsoring school and never
attended a university in the United States (often, the number of attackers entering on student
visas is inflated).38 In response, the U.S. government imposed a series of changes to the student
visa regime. The most notable of these is the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002, which facilitated the funding of biometric technologies for student visa tracking and
accelerated the Student and Exchange Visa Information System (SEVIS). In the fiscal year
immediately following these changes, student visas issued to all countries declined, on average,
by 20%; student visas issued to Muslim-majority countries declined, on average, by 58% and by
over 80% in some cases.39
I argue that the greatest fear described by policymakers discussing student visas is not
terrorists entering the United States on a student visas but students who might leave the United
States with knowledge that can be used in terrorism. This specter of dangerous knowledge rests
on an understanding of knowledge as capital that international students can leverage against the
United States. Regulation of such knowledge aims to determine who has mobility across borders,
what knowledge can be transferred across borders, and who is dangerous when they try to
transfer knowledge across borders. As Rep. Rohrabacher (R-CA) put it in 2003: “[O]ur system,
as it is working right now, a student can come in from a country that has many potential terrorists
... [a]nd they could come in on a student visa, and we wouldn’t even know if they left, as it
stands right now, isn’t that correct?”40 Through this anxiety of the foreign student, the university
becomes a site of risk for the creation of the terrorist.
In Chapter III, I examine the national security concerns articulated by lawmakers facing
the entry of Syrian refugees in 2015 and 2016. A number of lawmakers declared that Syrian
refugees represented a terrorist threat to the United States, arguing that a lack of surveillance
infrastructure in the Syrian crisis zones made it possible to confirm the identities of refugees.
At issue here is not merely the entry of Syrian refugees, but the lack of capacity for surveillance
in Syria. Democrats and Republicans both deploy the language of humanitarian concern but
argue that the lack of information on who the refugees really are is too much of a risk. Identity is
at issue here: what if a terrorist masquerades as a refugee in order to enter the United States and
commit acts of violence? Legislators, concerned with the fact that Syrian refugees are unable to
Andrew W. Neal, “‘Events Dear Boy, Events’: Terrorism and Security from the Perspective of Politics,” Critical
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provide full accounting of their life histories and proper documentation, turn to conversations
about systems of tracking and monitoring through biometric identifiers. Once again, policymakers turn to the fear over the obfuscation of identity that Muller highlights as fundamental to
the neoliberal biometric state.
I argue refugee policy is securitized specifically by the act of imagining a danger for the
U.S. home and family in Congressional discourse around Syrian refugees, namely the debate
around the American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015 and a series of hearings
held by Congressional committees. As Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC) puts it, ultimately: “We lock our
doors not because we hate the people on the outside. We lock our doors because we love the
people on the inside.”41 The particular language of vulnerability that characterizes refugee policy
marks women and children as those most deserving of humanitarian intervention. The entry of
Muslim, brown, de-masculinized, and fundamentally traumatized families into the United States
is articulated as a dangerously destabilizing force with regard to the image of the Christian,
white, child-bearing nuclear family.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I turn to the judicial arguments around the rollout of two Trump
executive orders, the so-called Muslim bans. The executive orders attempt to ban the entry of
and sharply reduce refugee admissions for people from a set of Muslim-majority countries in the
Middle East. Dealing primarily with the challenges to the orders from state governments, I
examine the treatments of risk and religion in the language of those who support the orders and
those who challenge them. The Trump orders generally frame Muslims as terrorists in a sort of
culmination of the processes discussed in the thesis as a whole: since potential terrorists are
Muslim, no matter whether students or refugees, the most effective method of managing risk is
to ban all Muslims. Comparing contemporary court cases to those filed in the aftermath of post9/11 policy that profiled on the basis of race and religion, I argue that such a framing has
produced unique circumstances to challenge religious profiling as unconstitutional in the courts.
In this thesis I seek to chart a piece of the complex that is Islamophobia in the United
States. Immigration policy discourse is but one site of many in discursive regime that attempts to
describe Muslims in the language of not-belonging. I offer my analysis of the securitization of
Muslims in these three particular moments of U.S. history in hopes that a greater understanding
of Islamophobia in the United States might contribute to its undoing or, at the very least, to
resisting those who continue to describe Muslims in the language of risk and terror.

41

American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015, HR 4038, 114th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record
161 (November 19, 2015): H8381, H8389.

13

II. Dangerous Knowledge:
Capital and Risk at the International University
The revelation that the student visa system played a role in the entry of the 9/11 attackers
into the country represents a paradigm shift in policy language about international students in the
United States. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, reports varied significantly as to the
number of attackers who entered as international students. A full investigation would eventually
reveal that only one of the nineteen hijackers entered on a student visa, though he did not list a
sponsoring school and never attended a university in the United States. Major press outlets
reported this number as early as November 200142 and it saw confirmation in the official 9/11
Commission report of 2004.43 Even then, misinformation persisted in the highest circles of
policy decision-making. Representative Barbara Jackson Lee commented during the House’s
2003 session that “it should be noted for the record that a high percentage of the hijackers came
in on student visas”—this despite the correct reporting of the numbers on the House floor mere
minutes earlier.44
In this chapter, I read debates, Congressional hearings, and policy documents addressing
the national security threat that international students present. Primarily dating between late 2001
and 2003, these materials include a set of hearings in the House and Senate that consider student
visas; two instruments of regulation, the Visa Condor system and the Student and Exchange Visa
Information System (SEVIS); and policy language and debate around the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, an omnibus immigration restriction bill that
includes several provisions to regulate international students. I begin by describing that which
Michael C. Ewers and Joseph M. Lewis call the “securitization of student migration,”45
comparing the growth of international student education to the rise of the language of risk in
policy descriptions of student visas. I then examine the policies that follow this regime of
securitization, drawing out the relation of surveillance and biometric technologies to anti-Muslim
policy prescriptions.
I draw attention to the convergence (and confusion) of public and private interest by
introducing an analysis of the Congressional Record through the lens of Benjamin Muller’s
theorization of an emergent ‘ID card assemblage.’ Private corporations and security-focused
state actors alike are interested in the expansion of the surveillance regime, which represents an
opportunity for profit and for control. The figure that emerges from the meeting point of
securitization and biometric assemblage is of concern to both private industry and national
security—the figure of the Muslim student of the sciences who will leverage dangerous
knowledge for use in terrorist activities.
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The securitization of the international student extends beyond the risk of terrorist entry to
include the risk presented by certain forms of knowledge leaving the country. Members of
Congress deal publicly with the concern that people masquerading as students will enter the
United States in order to commit acts of terror. Lawmakers reveal in their conversations in the
Congressional record that more concerning to them than terrorist entry is the knowledge that
leaves the United States. Policymakers worry about the economic losses presented by U.S.educated scholars leaving the country and the security concerns presented by students with
certain forms of technical education leaving for states that are considered suspect. Immigration
policy discourse about international students explores the necessity of enabling the circulation of
capital and the ever-strengthening call for the greater managing of risk. Ultimately, I argue that
the securitization of knowledge, particularly scientific and technical knowledge in the hands of
Muslim students, functions within the maintenance of the U.S. economy and the homeland
security complex.
The opening comments presented by Representative Ralph M. Hall at a House
Committee on Science hearing called “Foreign Students and Scholars in an Age of Terrorism”
offer an excellent example of the multiple layers of this conversation. As the title suggests, the
hearing is a response to the attacks on 9/11, which stand according to the hearing briefing as “a
stark reminder of the potential risks posed by foreign students.” Hall considered the question of
new systems to review international student visas in terms of capital and risk. On the one hand,
Hall pointed to the danger that regulating student visas will endanger the “benefit [of] attracting
talented international students to the universities... to keep the country in a place of scientific
leadership.” On the other, he worried, “we have to defend ourselves against terrorists.”46
Continued scientific leadership facilitated by foreign intellectual capital functions for Hall to
indicate economic and military supremacy through technological advancement, as it has
throughout modern U.S. history. Is such advancement, Hall might be paraphrased as asking,
mutually reconcilable for the post-9/11 awareness of the need to secure the homeland?
1. International university, national security47
“These students,” said Representative John Tierney in beginning an extended meditation
on international students at a Congressional hearing, “are able to experience an environment of
positive interchanges while they contribute to the intellectual achievements and cultural richness
of our universities, promote understanding across cultures, and acquire an appreciation for the
American values of freedom and democracy.” Tierney described the acceptance of international
students as wonderfully and mutually beneficial, a generous extension of U.S. culture and values
to those most in need, in exchange for the potential for learning that these students bring.
Tellingly, the argument Tierney leveraged against restrictionist policies regarding international
students is an economic one. He cited the President of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s anxiety over “aggravat[ing] our national shortage of highly skilled scientists and
engineers,” then turns to the possibility of “risk[ing] a brain drain” to other similarly developed
states.48 The university system, for Tierney, must be concerned with technological advancement
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relevant to other states—that is, international student education is an issue of competition on the
global scale.
The paradise of international exchange that Tierney describes finds itself in conflict with
the regime of homeland security. As a part of the response to the 9/11 attacks, policymakers
begin framing international students as sites of risk, engaging in a securitization process. To be
clear, Tierney’s analysis is not inaccurate: the system of international student exchange certainly
functions within national and global economies. In 2002, almost 583,000 international students
were enrolled in U.S. universities and postsecondary institutions. For the 2015-2016 school year,
enrollment data sits at over a million.49 International students in the United States mark a fraction
of the global economy of student exchange: 3.7 million students studied under international
education visas in 2009 worldwide.50 International students have a not-insignificant economic
impact in the United States, often through the influx of capital in tuition dollars and cost-ofliving spending. In 2014, international students contributed $27 billion to the U.S. economy, with
tuition fees generally representing the primary source.51 Students entering on education visas
represent a contributor to the U.S. economy, initialized in the internationalization of higher
education that began in the 1990s.52
In other words, for Tierney and as demonstrated by the very fact that these data are
collected, international higher education is an industry. In part, the student visa system in the pre9/11 United States was not regulated because regulation would imply a restriction of capital.
More complex bureaucracies of international student entry disincentivize border-crossing for the
purpose of education. Given that international students contribute to the economy of the
receiving state, the paradigm of neoliberal political economy demands that the state make
border-crossing for the purpose of education less complex in order to facilitate economic growth.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) includes higher education under its list of
commitments to removing barriers to international trade. Antoni Verger suggests that the rapid
growth in the number of international students worldwide can be traced to the 1984 negotiations
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), known as the Uruguay Round. The
negotiators of the Uruguay Round put into place a classification system of all tradeable goods
and services known as the Central Product Classification registry. “Education services” is
included in this registry, though the negotiators of the Uruguay Round do not seem to have held
education as an issue of particular importance—rather, they turned to the registry because it
allowed states to harmonize regulation systems for key services trade with little room for
confusion. When the Uruguay Round negotiators formally adopted this registry, education fell
under the competence of services liberalization under the incipient World Trade Organization.53
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Crucially, the registry excludes services which are seen as “neither tradeable nor
commercially provided,”54 generally accepted to indicate services that are public goods. In other
words, the GATT negotiators set into motion the classification of higher education as a private,
tradeable service. The deregulation of trade in services under the GATT and its various
successors generally involves the de-emphasis of border restrictions in order to better enable the
circulations of capital.55 Higher education as a border-crossing source of profit, that which the
members of Congress encounter in 2002 and 2003, is made possible only by the deregulation of
international trade in education services under the neoliberal agenda of the WTO.
The intrusion of national security as an organizing principle on the unabashedly
internationalized system of higher education represents the process of securitization. Take, for
instance, a press release issued by Senator Dianne Feinstein in late September of 2001. Feinstein
claimed the U.S.’s “national security depends on our [entry] system functioning to ensure that
terrorists do not take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the student visa program.” In order to
accomplish such a momentous task, Feinstein proposed a moratorium on international student
entry. 56 Thus unfolds the quintessential logic of risk management: if all individuals in a given
category represent potential risk, then the demand of avoiding risks necessitates removing all
such individuals. In drawing on such a framework, Feinstein recast Tierney’s vision of ‘positive
interchanges’ into a rather more nightmarish vision of international students seeking out
vulnerabilities to exploit.
Terrorist entry is certainly a concern for U.S. policymakers dealing with international
student education, as Feinstein’s proposal shows, but in some ways such conversations mask the
anxieties over students educated in the United States leaving with certain types of knowledge.
Ewers and Lewis argue Feinstein’s proposal stands as “the invocation of emergency measures
[that] represents the crossing of a clear securitization threshold.” In this specific securitization
act, Feinstein presents the object labeled as threat as the entry of terrorists into the United
States.57
I suggest that Ewers and Lewis deal only with the surface-level securitization of the
student visa in this time period. Congressional discourse makes clear that terrorist entry is not the
only source of risk when it comes to international students: knowledge is, as well.
2. Securitizing the student visa
While the United States implemented a number of measures to increase the rigor of the
visa application process after 9/11, two are especially worth attention here. One, Visa Condor,
deals with preventing terrorists from entering the United States and instituting more rigorous
screenings of student visas; the other, the Student and Exchange Visa Information System
(SEVIS), deals with the more ephemeral problem of who has access to what knowledge. Visa
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Condor was the first visa regulation system that can be truly described as ‘post-9/11.’ Starting in
January 2002, the program subjected visa applicants from Muslim-majority countries to
increased monitoring. Those studying sensitive technologies on student visas were especially
marked as risks. SEVIS is a surveillance and tracking program implemented in the year after the
attack, though it was proposed after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Visa Condor and
SEVIS engage with different anxieties about international students: the former deals with an
intensely Islamophobic concern about terrorist entry, the latter with the worry that certain forms
of knowledge will leave the United States in the hands of those who would do harm to it. Both
deploy biometric technology in the name of national security and private industry.
Visa Condor required mandatory security screenings for visa applicants from twenty-six
countries, most of which are Muslim-majority countries.58 Essentially, the program implemented
extensive screening and biometric tracking for visa applicants who were likely to be Muslim.
The program was significantly changed in 2004, both in scope of application and bureaucracy,
but in the intervening two years approximately 130,000 checks were completed under Visa
Condor. None yielded a visa denial on the grounds of terrorist activity. 59 House Committee on
Science staff reports suggested that Condor targeted applications “particularly from those
[students] in high tech, engineering and science” from “Arab and Muslim countries.” Thus Visa
Condor begins by enacting a slippage of ethnicity and religion in its definition of risk. The
strategy of targeting suspect student populations is not new: Visa Condor is an extension of a
program called Visa Mantis, a security check process implemented during the Cold War for
work, study, or research regarding technologies that might have military use.60 Half a year after
Visa Condor began, the program’s scope was replicated in the infamous National Security ExitEntry Registration System, or ‘Special Registration,’ which similarly targeted visa and LPR
holders from Muslim-majority countries.
Originally known as the Coordinated Interagency Partnerships Regulating International
Students (CIPRIS) under the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
SEVIS essentially monitors international students. CIPRIS was delayed mostly due to lack of
political will. The attacks on 9/11 and the Patriot Act added significant momentum to
implementation of the program.61 The primary function of SEVIS is reporting. Universities are
required to report to intelligence agencies any time a student on an F1, J, or M visa legally
changes their name; reports a new residence address; changes their field of study, type of degree,
or source of academic funding; requests authorization for off-campus employment; or violates
any condition of visa status, including academic suspension, enrollment of credits under a certain
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required level, or criminal conviction.62 Essentially, SEVIS is a system by which universities and
intelligence agencies track all international students for any signs of risk behavior.
SEVIS does not impose more stringent conditions for the granting of a student visa.
Implementation rests entirely on universities, which must apply for SEVIS authorization and
then coordinate with immigration authorities. Janis Sposato, as of 2002 a high-ranking attorney
in the Bush administration immigration bureaucracy, pointed to the limits of SEVIS: “In and of
itself, SEVIS is not a system that is intended to prevent terrorism. It is intended to track people
and their immigration status as a student. So if a terrorist is scrupulous about attending class and
maintaining his status, there is nothing in this system that will help us.”63 Simply put, SEVIS
does not necessarily indicate who is and who is not a terrorist. Instead, it identifies behaviors that
act as markers of risk. SEVIS operates under the assumption that an international student who is
about to commit an act of terrorism will stop attending classes, attempt to mask or somehow alter
their identity, and so on.
The targeted reporting system function of SEVIS renders the surveillance program tied to
the management of identities of a population rendered suspect after 9/11. Sposato described
SEVIS as strangely passive, with the (implicitly male) terrorist only noticed if playing truant. But
SEVIS resonates far beyond the lecture hall: consider, for instance, that under SEVIS
immigration authorities must be notified if a trans student changes their name, or if a student
stops attending classes for mental health reasons. SEVIS creates conditions under which
international students are disciplined to be disciplinary: identities that are not static are presumed
‘risky’ and marked as suspect in the name of national security.
To return to the problem raised by Hall quoted at the start of this chapter, the institution
of a surveillance regime in higher education seems to endanger the circulation of capital on
which the international university relies. Regulation in the financial sense and in the disciplinary
sense create conditions that seem to disincentivize international students from participating in
exchange programs. Indeed, Benjamin Muller notes the tensions between “the alleged security
imperatives of the post-9/11 world” and “the commitment to neoliberal ideas of free markets,
mobile labor, and flowing capital.” 64 The homeland security regime demands a certain mistrust
of border-crossing, as Visa Condor shows, and of those who have already crossed borders, as
with SEVIS. Neoliberal capitalism, in contrast, understands movement across borders linked to
the demand for labor and ideas as crucial for functioning markets. Many scholars argue that these
are contradictory urges for policymakers, as indicated in Hall’s dilemma. Muller disagrees. He
argues that post-9/11 immigration policy produces an ‘ID card assemblage’ such that
government tracking and surveillance programs operate constitutively with private industry that
relies on transnational capital and labor.
Muller’s analysis centers on a case study of the use of biometrics in Canadian airports in
the early 2000s. He observes that technologies that link information collected about bodies to
security find use in a private industry deeply relevant to public concern. Canadian airports
operate either as state-owned corporations or privatized state-owned corporations, but generally
contract out technical labor to industry partners. Muller suggests that airports function as a site
where technological expertise, private industry, and government interest meet, creating
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conditions that “heighten the reliance within government on individuals and organizations...
located within the biometrics industry.”65 The convergence of public and private interests in a
particular biometric technology system represents the key characteristic of Muller’s ID card
assemblage.
Muller does not venture toward a full definition of the ID card assemblage. Generally
speaking, he describes it in terms of “divergent rationales, logics of rule, actors, and networks”
that interact to form a “convergent system of control.” In the case of the debate about national ID
cards in Canada, the convergence creates “an over-determined field of identity management that
already assumes the use of biometric technology.” Key here is that which Muller labels a
discourse of “inevitability”: policymakers not versed in technology begin to understand
biometrics to represent the way of the future and deploy surveillance policy as a sort of panacea
to all problems.66 The ID card assemblage, to draw out a generalizable from Muller’s specific
study, is that system of control which emerges from a field of competing and convergent state
and corporate interests, and produces identity management through the assumption or
inevitability of biometric surveillance.
I introduce the ID card assemblage as a theoretical framework to bring together multiple
discursive strands and strategies deployed by members of Congress in talking about higher
education, economic competition, and risk. In the sections that follow, I track two conversations
that I argue mark the boundaries of an ID card assemblage under the post-9/11 regime of student
visa regulation. First, members of Congress conceive of international students who leave the
United States as a loss of investment, in that people educated in U.S. universities cross borders
with the capital they gained from the system of higher education. Second, policymakers conceive
of certain technical knowledge in the hands of international students from Muslim-majority
countries to represent a significant site of risk. Both conversations bring together the concerns of
the state and industry about populations, capital, and risk.
3. “I would like to keep them here”
In the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, members of Congress begin
discussing visa restrictions and surveillance in the context of the U.S. economy, returning to the
critical role that immigrant labor plays in key growth sectors. Take the testimony submitted to a
hearing commenting on proposed restrictions to student visas in October 2001 by Marlene M.
Johnson, the executive director of the largest professional association for international student
educators. She struck an urgent tone, writing that “what is being decided now is nothing less than
whether we will or not we will make the investment in educating the next generation of world
leaders.” Such leaders are sure to play a role in assisting the United States in “the next generation
of international crises.” For Johnson, members of Congress were debating “about America’s
continued capacity to lead.”67 Johnson, knowingly or unknowingly, anticipated a shift in the
conversation about international students after 9/11. While policy discussions about Visa
Condor, SEVIS, and other responses to the use of student visas in the 9/11 attack remain in the
foreground, members of Congress from both parties begin to frame international students who
leave the United States as a threat to U.S. technological and economic supremacy.
Much of such language enters in a 2003 hearing convened to address the issue of
international students and the entry of terrorists. Almost immediately after the start of the
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hearing, the conversation shifted to concerns about the supply of education. Representative
Ralph Hall described his frustration with “the percentage of foreign participation” in the U.S.
university system. He noted that while international students represent “some benefit to this
country,” they also limit the number of U.S. students in U.S. universities. Representative Nick
Smith understands this as an opportunity to remark that benefit only accrues when international
students stay: “If these are exceptional individuals that can help us either in the university level
or in research and in commerce, I would like to keep them here.”68 For Hall and Smith, the
limited supply of education—universities cannot serve every person who applies—leads the
United States to define its interests by assessing the economic potential of university students. In
effect, these representatives set aside the framework of higher education as transnational
industry, a move grounded in a neoliberal regime from which the United States benefits greatly,
to make a narrow argument about national advantage.
While Johnson introduces the concept of an investment in leadership, the return in
question here is very much an economic one. Representative Sherwood Boehlert pointed in
alarm to the fact that while 70 percent of international students receiving Ph.D.’s from U.S.
universities used to stay in the United States, 70 percent now leave—and then qualified the
figure by stating that he “pulled this figure out of thin air.” Boehlert invented this figure to
indicate the “real alarming deficiency in the United States... [of] students in the science, math,
and engineering disciplines” who are entering “Corporate America.” Similarly, Representative
Dana Rohrabacher argued that because “American people pay a lot of their tax dollars into
[higher] education institutions” it is unacceptable for international students to not stay in the
United States after receiving such subsidized education. 69 As U.S. taxpayers fund the university
system, those who benefit from U.S. higher education are expected to give back. Boehlert’s
mention of ‘Corporate America’ makes explicit the expected support provided by U.S. public
universities to the private sector.
SEVIS marks an area of interest for these members of Congress in that they hope it can
be configured to track international students in more economically valuable disciplines to stay in
the United States. David Ward, an expert witness and President of the American Council on
Education, described SEVIS as an opportunity for the “scientific community and the security
community [to] come together to talk to each other to solve these problems” of tension between
homeland security and economy. In this same vein, Rohrabacher referenced a bill that he
cosponsored to route international students likely to leave the country into working for NASA.
He argued that “we need some government service” for National Science Foundation grants to
non-citizens in order to facilitate a return on investment.70 Routing international students in
technical fields toward government service provides for the retention of U.S.-funded intellectual
capital. Given that the post-Cold War NASA functions within the U.S. national security
complex, Rohrabacher’s proposal would link innovation in the scientific community to the
defense of the homeland.
Smith, meanwhile, proposed using SEVIS to “help facilitate” marriages between U.S.
citizens “exceptional individuals” he mentioned in order to facilitate the naturalization and
assimilation of those international students. He raised the point almost as a spontaneous aside
when responding to an expert witness who had mentioned naturalizing through marriage.
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‘Keeping them here’ becomes for Smith a matter of leveraging any possible functions of the
state.71 These somewhat incoherent suggestions for SEVIS manage to articulate both economic
and biopolitical expressions of the need to keep certain forms of knowledge in the country.
Retaining scientists, whether through government-funded research or government-sponsored (?)
marriages, is equivalent to ensuring profit.
In the words of Tierney, quoted near the start of this chapter, people in Congress worried
that the United States “risk[s] a brain drain” to other similarly developed states.72 Tierney’s fear
might be better rephrased as a concern that the United States risks being ineffective at enacting
brain drain. Students who return to their home countries interrupt the project of U.S. empire to
extract intellectual and economic capital. Even more concerning, perhaps, are those students who
leave U.S. universities to work in the technology industries of similarly developed countries:
Tierney lists Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom as countries likely to benefit
economically from restrictionist policies toward international students in the United States.73
The contours of Muller’s ID card assemblage emerge from this blurring of public and
private interests around the regulation of student visas. The competitiveness of U.S. science and
technology industries rely on policies enacted by the U.S. government, those which regulate a
group of im/migrants through surveillance and tracking. At work here is the presumed
inevitability that Muller describes—despite SEVIS’s somewhat limited scope, policymakers
attempt to deploy it as a solution to a dispersed field of problems. Knowledge in these
conversations is instrumentalized in economic competition, with university programs for
international students described in the language of an investment that goes beyond the scope of
the transaction of tuition dollars. The approach to international higher education as an investment
in human capital described here marks a discursive starting point for thinking about knowledge
as something that can cross borders for use against the United States.
4. Dangerous knowledge
Following the idea that knowledge can be instrumentalized by students who return to
their home countries with a U.S. education is the understanding that, in certain conditions, the
transmission of knowledge across borders represents a site of risk. “We have many students here,
foreign students,” announced Representative Dana Rohrabacher at a House Committee on
Science hearing, “who come from non-Democratic countries, who are potential adversaries of
the United States.” He was speaking to Janice Jacobs, then a State Department official in Visa
Services. The question to which Rohrabacher was building, and eventually answered himself,
dealt with the dangers of educating international students on sensitive technologies: “...are we
training, are we allowing students from Pakistan and India into the United States to get Ph.D.’s
so they can be equipped to make nuclear weapons? I think the answer is yes, is it not?”74
Rohrabacher writes U.S. universities as complicit in propping up authoritarian regimes and
raising the stakes of the India-Pakistan conflict. The culprit in all this, that which is dangerous
for Rohrabacher, is knowledge.
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Of course, not all knowledge is dangerous. For Congress after 9/11, only certain
knowledge in certain hands presented a problem. Rohrabacher encapsulates this well: he worried
about students trained to make nuclear weapons going to ‘non-democratic countries’ such as
Pakistan and India, an orientalist swoop that manages to paint two of the largest democracies in
the world as despotic regimes. At work here is a particular sort of securitization that takes
knowledge as the object that presents a threat. Such securitization deploys the human capital
framework discussed above, whereby knowledge becomes a commodity that can be transported
across borders, within a political field that renders Muslims as a population marked by risk.
The effort to identify certain knowledge in certain hands as a threat comes from both
sides of the aisle. The notoriously anti-immigrant Rohrabacher joined centrist Senate Democrats
in raising concerns about students leaving the United States with dangerous knowledge. Senator
Robert Byrd, who is a Democrat, offered a three-part securitization move in the debate over the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. First, he pointed out that “there are more
than 500,000 foreign students in the United States who are benefiting from the goodwill of this
country and from our investment in education.” Next, Byrd referenced the types of learning that
these students are doing: “Many of these are nuclear engineering scholars. Many of them are
biochemistry students. Many of them are pilot trainees who have access to dangerous
technology, training, and information.” Finally, he linked all international students to the 9/11
hijackers by suggesting that “it should be noted that one of the September 11 hijackers entered
the United States on a student visa, dropped out of classes, and remained here illegally
thereafter.”75 Byrd constructs all international students as risks through their association with one
international student who committed an act of terror.
Byrd’s formulation is especially effective because he linked the knowledge that enabled
the 9/11 attacks (namely, flight school training for several of the attackers, only one of whom
entered on a valid student visa) to knowledge unrelated to the attacks that might be suspect, such
as nuclear engineering and biochemistry. Entry on a student visa is not so much a marker of risk
as is that knowledge to which a student visa grants access. Indeed, much of the danger here lies
with potentiality. Senator Dianne Feinstein commented in the same hearing as Byrd that she did
not believe that “the people of my State or the people of America want us to give advanced
nuclear training to those who would conduct a nuclear program and use that program against
us.”76 The mere presence of a particular form of knowledge that has the potential to be
operationalized against the United States indicates the potential for risk.
Islam emerges here as the category by which knowledge can be identified as dangerous.
Rohrabacher’s testimony above links dangerous knowledge to an assumed-to-be-violent conflict
between Pakistan and India, both coded as the Orient and therefore regressive, violent, and
Muslim. Later, Rohrabacher worried that “a student can come in from a country that has many
potential terrorists,” the typifying example of which is “Egypt where we know that they have got
some radical Islamic people there.”77 Feinstein held up the fact that U.S. universities “have given
a higher education to the head of the Islamic Jihad” as the sign of ultimate failure. 78 Republican
Senator Orrin Hatch pushed hard for “religious activities” to be included among the guidelines
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that determine when the FBI notifies DHS about a concerning visa applicant.79 On the policy
level, Visa Condor deals almost exclusively with Muslim-majority countries in imposing more
stringent visa restrictions linked to people studying certain technologies.
An exemplar of the convergence of War on Terror foreign policy logic and anti-Muslim
nation-of-origin immigration restrictionism comes with the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905), some years after the hearings discussed above. Passed
with relatively little difficulty, H.R. 1905 aimed to clarify the sanctions regime leveraged against
Iran and institute several measures to warn Syria’s Assad government about human rights
violations. H.R. 1905 includes a provision, Section 501, named “Exclusion of citizens of Iran
seeking education relating to the nuclear and energy sections of Iran”:
The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude
from the United States, any alien who is a citizen of Iran that the Secretary of State determines
seeks to enter the United States to participate in coursework at an institution of higher education...
to prepare the alien for a career in the energy sector of Iran or in nuclear science or nuclear
engineering or a related field in Iran.80

Section 501 authorizes restricted entry for Iranian nationals who can be ‘determined’ to seek a
career in energy or nuclear science. Immigration officials must concern themselves with motive
in the process of deciding if entry for an Iranian student is allowable. At work here is the
fascination with motive that Talal Asad notes characterizes liberal discourse on terror. Section
501 does not attempt to discern how people “justify... violence in terms of a discursive religious
tradition” that Asad observes,81 but rather to determine the motive that underlies the pursuit of
knowledge. This pursuit, by the neat metonymic move that characterizes this conversation about
dangerous knowledge, is coded by the markers of Islam and risk. Interestingly, earlier versions
of H.R. 1905 included two provisions that restricted entry from Iranian government officials and
restricted entry for anyone related to corporate activity implicated in human rights violations, to
Iranian nuclear proliferation, or to sponsors of international terrorism.82 Both were removed after
the Senate amended the bill. The language of restricted entry mentioned in these provisions
seems83 to have been replaced by Section 501 in the final bill. Reading the history of H.R. 1905’s
language suggests a direct link between Section 501 in the final bill and the intent of barring the
entry of potential terrorists in earlier versions.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, “Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism” (107th Cong., 2 nd
sess., June 6, 2002), 19.
80
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,” H.R. 1905, Public Law No:
112-158 (2012).
81
Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, Wellek Library Lectures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 29, 3637, 41-45, 102n26.
82
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2011, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong., 1nd sess., Congressional
Record 157 (December 13, 2011), H8845-H8846.
83
‘Seems’ is the operative word here. I am unable to find any record of the Congressional conversation behind the
writing of Section 501. The debate over the bill as represented in the Congressional Record concerns itself for the
most part with the sanctions imposed by H.R. 1905 (see, for instance, the debates beginning on Cong. Rec. 157
H8834, Cong. Rec. 158 S3641, and Cong. Rec. 158 H5552) contain no mention of international students, broadly, or
Section 501’s prohibition of Iranian student entry, specifically. While there are indications that such edits might
have taken place as a result of a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing in 2002, that hearing is not
available in any of the publicly accessible databases that publish hearing transcripts.
79

24

5. Toward a student visa card assemblage
The surveillance and tracking components of SEVIS act as responses to the threat
presented by knowledge leaving the country for the use of terrorists. At one point in the debate
over expanding the reporting requirements for SEVIS, Senator Sam Brownback described the
monitoring of international students in terms of the total number of border crossings in 2001: “If
we are looking at 330 million people in a universe and are trying to hone this down to several
hundred, we need a lot of information.”84 He justified data collection not only through
rhetorically inflating the number of international students entering the country, and therefore the
number of potential threats, but also by assuming that some proportion of those entrants are
suspect. The use of SEVIS to identify who is at risk of leaving the country with dangerous
knowledge deploys biometrics in part on the presumption that such an incident is inevitable.
Policymakers quickly move past the utility and reality of applying biometrics in risk
management, instead exploring what might be called technological fantasy. Biometric
technologies allow immigration authorities to “eliminate people who steal passports and try to
enter as, you know, false identities,” as explained in 2001 by Mary Ryan, then Assistant
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs. She was commenting on the expansion of SEVIS under
the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, specifically the implementation of “a
really great biometric” that read biometric data from a digitized photograph. This would allow
immigration officials to compare these data with those presented on visa application forms. Ryan
compared the reading of facial measurements favorably to the “talk about fingerprinting and all
that,” suggesting photo-based technology was far less expensive. She was responding to a
question from Representative Michael Castle, who quite excitedly spoke about creating “secure
visa cards with biometric information on them” and implementing a sort of biometrically
informed watermark as an “identification methodology” on visas.85 Ryan begins with a purely
entry-focused piece of technology dealing with the possibility of a person falsely identifying as
an international student. Castle turns to a national system of tracking, monitoring, and biometric
surveillance, almost as if the latter is a natural extension of the former.
This moment might act as an exemplar of the politics of inevitability that Muller argues
marks political attitudes toward biometrics and surveillance technology after the 9/11 attacks. As
Muller puts it, “the overall escalation of specifically biometric ID card strategies as the sole
legitimate solution to a particular articulation of the contemporary problem that is ‘insecure
identity’” constitutes the logic of the ID card assemblage.86 Indeed, Castle was describing
technology that at the time did not exist, while the technology Ryan described is invasive and has
proven prone to problems: Junaid Rana offers one instance in which mistaken identities based on
the sharing of data mined from photos provoked an international manhunt for the wrong people:
the entry of several unauthorized Pakistani migrants triggered an overeager FBI press release
about “potential terrorist activities” that publicized photos linked to the documentation of a
jeweler who lived in and had not left Lahore.87 Castle’s casual suggestion that a system-wide
biometric card could act as the solution to a problem of very limited scope demonstrates the
presumed inevitability of biometrics about which Muller writes.

84

Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001, S2654.
U.S. Congress, House, “Tracking International Students in Higher Education,” 50-51.
86
Muller, Security, Risk, and the Biometric State, 51.
87
Junaid Rana, Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora (Durham: Duke University Press,
2011), 54, 57-60.
85

25

The discourse of inevitability serves a very particular set of interests at the meeting point
of the public national security sector and the private technology sector. Rana, drawing from a set
of interviews given by Colin Powell, calls attention to what Powell names the ‘terror-industrial
complex.’ The complex emerges when, in Powell’s words, the U.S. homeland security apparatus
“get[s] so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counter-terrorist problem that
we essentially are creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat
pumped up.”88 Under the terror-industrial complex, the language of terror coupled with the
maintenance of the logic of exception produces incredible technological innovation oriented
against risk populations. Deepa Fernandes has detailed the blurring of private industry and
government in homeland security contracting, in which she observed contractors approaching
government officials to request grant proposals for surveillance technology already in
development.89 Such relationships constitute the specific and contextual forms through which
this particular ID card assemblage takes hold under the rubric of homeland security: convergent
state and corporate interests produce investment in a particular set of biometric technologies
driven by the logics of terror and risk.
I call attention to the terror-industrial complex to show that the Congressional
conversation about surveilling international students not only represents the meeting point for the
market interests of certain public and private actors but also the meeting point of market
strategies. Rana and Fernandes demonstrate that rhetoric about terror informs the ways in which
capital circulates. Under the homeland security regime, the government grants money to those
companies that produce technologies to assess and manage risk. Those companies contribute to
the U.S. economy through the job creation and tax dollars. The maintenance of the terrorindustrial complex proves to be of interest to those private sector actors, in that they generate
profit as long as homeland security grants continue, and to public sector actors, who can claim
the benefits of economic growth and national security both.
It follows, then, that the Islamophobia written underneath this rhetoric about terror will
find new form in the circulations of capital that I here mark using Muller’s ID card assemblage.
The relation between global capital and Islamophobia in U.S. policy-making has been
documented elsewhere in the work of Rana, Jasbir Puar, and Dylan Rodriguez.90 The production
of anti-Muslim sentiment is itself an industry of sorts, bankrolled by a network of funders and
foundations that link together grassroots organizers, media outlets, and politicians. Millions of
dollars flow in the United States towards the maintenance of Islamophobia. Included in this
network are trainings that Islamophobic scholars provide to law enforcement officers and
foundations that offer funding to the campaigns of anti-Muslim hawkish politicians.91 The
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circulations of capital that make up the Islamophobia network are imbricated in the homeland
security complex.
A number of scholars have written extensively on the turn to the disposability of the
Muslim body after the 9/11 attacks.92 Nadine Naber writes that violence against Muslims or
those perceived-as-Muslim creates an “‘internment of the psyche’, [a] general sense that one is
always being watched and could at any time be attacked, deported, or disappeared” for
immigrant communities.93 The violence directed against Muslims from the gas station to the
immigration detention center to Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the CIA black sites certainly
create conditions of psychic and emotional stress, not only against those attacked but against
those who feel likely to be attacked. Thus profiling, by which bodily markers are taken to
indicate which bodies are Muslim, does work beyond the immediate act of racialized
recognition. Bodily violence directed at these presumed-to-be-Muslims, by the state and by
individuals tacitly enabled by the state, mark them in turn as disposable, detainable, and
deportable.
The post-9/11 anxieties on which I comment here, in contrast, represent an obsession
with the Muslim brain. The terrorist constructed in these Congressional conversations, and the
policy that such conversations produce, deal with the potential for knowledge to become
weaponized. The profiling of bodies through physical characteristics cannot function in the
world of student visa applications and international higher education—that is, it is impossible to
use bodily markers in the policing of entry for international students under the regime of higher
education as industry. The ID card assemblage that emerges around international student visas
seeks to prevent knowledge, whether coded in the language of economic supremacy or in that of
national security, from exiting the country. I see this as distinct from the securitization of
international students to which Ewers and Lewis refer: the entry of terrorists to the United States
through student visas is a security matter in terms of what will happen after entry; this concern
ends when those in question have left the United States. The securitization of dangerous
knowledge, building off the knowledge-as-capital framework, marks the figure of the Muslim
student of the sciences as a potential terrorist.
The securitization of the student visa is one piece of the broad-scale proliferation of
potential terrorists in the years following 2001. While the language of risk first used to describe
international students deals with the fear that student visas present an opportunity for terrorist
entry, the anxiety that follows centers on knowledge that leaves the United States. Bordercrossing represents a potential loss of capital and a potential national security threat for the
United States when U.S.-educated international students leave with knowledge that is somehow
suspect. The figure that emerges as one who represents a risk is the Muslim student of the
sciences. The risk management approach to international students deploys a system of regulation
and surveillance that blurs the lines between private interests and the needs of the state. The
impulses to simultaneously maintain the deregulation of capital and ensure the regulation of risk
finds realization in the student visa card apparatus that emerges in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks.
See, for instance, Rana’s chapter “The Muslim Body” in Terrifying Muslims; much of Puar’s Terrorist
Assemblages, but especially “‘The Turban is Not a Hat”: Queer Diaspora and the Practices of Profiling”; Erin
Runions’ work on Abu Ghraib; and the extensive work on post-9/11 racial/religious profiling from Sunaina Maira
and Sangay Mishra.
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III. Would-be Terrorists:
Uncertain Configurations of the Syrian Refugee
“Can you name for me or identify for me a suicidal terrorist that was not a Muslim?” The
question, directed by Representative Steve King (R-IA) to Leon Rodriguez, Director of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, came at the tail end of a House Judiciary hearing on the
security implications of the Syrian refugee crisis. Convened by the Subcommittee on
Immigration and Border Security just days after the disastrous November 2015 attacks in Paris,
the hearing was charged. Rep. King’s question was followed by murmurs throughout the
chamber and sputters of surprise from Rodriguez. His follow-up was even more startling:
“You’re telling me that you’re doing a thorough vetting process, but you’re unable to tell me that
you specifically ask [Syrian refugees] what their religion is. And if you don’t specifically ask
them, then neither are you able to quantify the risk to the American society.”94
King describes a fear that emerges at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis: what if
Syrian refugees admitted to the United States come in order to commit attacks of violence? The
picture of Syrian refugees that emerges from Congressional discourse in 2015 and 2016 is one in
which identities and intentions are unknowable. This deep uncertainty demands the imposition of
a risk management approach to refugee entry, one that specifically imagines Muslim Syrian
refugees as a danger to the U.S. home and family and demands greater surveillance in the United
States and abroad.
In this chapter, I read Congressional hearings and debates from 2015 and 2016 that deal
with the so-called Syrian refugee crisis. The hearings consider the immigration policy, foreign
policy, and security policy implications of the refugee crisis, while the bill on which I focus, the
American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015, offers harsh reforms to the program of
refugee entry. The term refugee crisis is something of a misnomer, given that it received the
greatest publicity when people fleeing from Syria attempted the European Union as asylees. As I
note below, the imaginary of the Syrian refugee crisis, and the securitization of Syrian refugees
more specifically, relies on a writing of the United States and the European Union as the West
endangered by a mass of refugees. When policymakers apply the language of risk to Syrian
refugees, they do so imagining a simultaneous danger to the U.S. home and family and to
Western civilization itself.
Here, it must be noted, such logic may cost Syrian people their lives. As I write, in April
2017, it seems that the Syrian government may have killed over 70 Syrians using chemical
weapons. This is by no means a new state of affairs. In Syria it seems that Mbembe’s “war
machine,” that which operates beyond or in blatant violation of the state’s “claim to ultimate of
final authority in a particular political space,” has taken control. Those who live within the
regime of the war machines are at once subject to the logics of the state of exception, the state of
siege, and the biopolitical state.95 In this sense, the border security apparatus of the United States
extends its regime of necropolitics beyond territoriality. While I leave it to others to debate the
nature of al-Assad’s Syria, whether it is a failed state, a suicidal state, or otherwise, I would be
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remiss to not point out that the discussion here over whether refugees are dangerous can (and
often does) elide the fact that many Syrians live in conditions of near-constant danger.
1. Refugees or infiltrators?
King’s response typifies an attitude of uncertainty as to the motives of Syrian refugees
that emerges in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, one that sought to identify whether those
fleeing the crisis truly needed assistance or whether they might seek to do harm to the United
States. This line of questioning saw prominence after reports emerged that one of the attackers
had entered France among a wave of refugees. In the days before the hearing at which King
spoke, 31 state governors announced their dissent toward the entry of Syrian refugees into their
states. Just a month earlier, President Barack Obama had announced that he would allow 10,000
Syrian refugees into the United States. 96
The Syrian refugee crisis, as it came to be known in the United States, began many years
before these conversations. The first mass movements out of Syria began as early as April of
2011, when 5,000 Syrian people fled fighting in the town of Talkalakh.97 It was not until 2014
that the number of Syrians entering the United States as refugees spiked above the previous
annual maximum of 36 people. By the end of 2014, the State Department had accepted 208
refugees from Syria; that number increased significantly to 2,089 Syrian refugees in the year of
2015. As of April 2017, the total number of Syrian refugees in the United States numbers 20,635,
following over 15,000 entries in calendar year 2016.98 A number of Syrian people enter through
affirmative asylum, which requires an applicant to be physically present in the United States.
2012, 2013, and 2014 saw 327, 750, and 868 Syrians granted affirmative asylum status,
respectively, up from between zero and 40 in previous years.99 Asylees are generally considered
distinct from refugees, who may not be physically present in the United States at time of
application.100
The blurring of the line between asylees and refugees into a single Syrian refugee crisis
enables a parallel blurring by which all receiving states are presumed to face the same set of
problems. The same day as the hearing quoted above, during a debate over a proposed piece of
legislation that would make the entry of Syrian refugees subject to a prohibitive degree of
scrutiny, Representative Michael McCaul commented that “ISIS has vowed, in their own words,
to exploit the refugee process... [and] infiltrate the West.”101 The bill in question, known as the
American SAFE Act, will be discussed later in the chapter; more pressing for now is McCaul’s
anxiety-fueled revival of ‘the West’ as an object of terrorism. Under McCaul’s logic, threats to
Europe are threats to the United States. A report produced by House Homeland Security
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Committee researchers around the time of the debate deploys the more austere language of
policy analysis to effect the same revival. The report notes that “Mediterranean and Balkan
countries risk becoming a new ‘terrorist turnpike’ into the West” such that “America’s security is
put at risk [because] partner countries fail to conduct adequate counterterrorism checks on
refugees and are unable to cope with the radicalization challenges created by mass migration.” 102
The language of the report produces a strange metonymic chain by which entry into the southern
and eastern states of the European Union is understood as entry into the West as a whole and
therefore more specifically as (potential) entry into the United States.
Legislators and analysts who take the Paris attacks as a case study in what might happen
to the United States engage in an act of elision that groups together two entirely different
migration contexts. The structure of asylum policy in the European Union was poorly situated
for the mass entry of asylum seekers. Previous to the Syrian refugee crisis, the governing
directive of the Common European Asylum System was the Dublin Regulation, which requires
asylum seekers to remain in the first E.U. country in which they applied for asylum. The socalled ‘first country of arrival’ principle “lays a disproportional burden on the countries on
Europe’s southern border.”103 It is precisely those countries that were overwhelmed by Syrian
asylum seekers in 2015, resulting in the suspension of the Dublin Regulation and the unregulated
entry of Syrians into the European Union on a significant scale. Refugee entry into the United
States, as is discussed later in this chapter, operates through a completely different process, most
markedly in that Syrians entering the United States cannot do so through unauthorized bordercrossings.
Despite this difference, the Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis emerges in full
force.104 Samuel Huntington infamously proposed a world system in which “the conflicts of the
future occur along the cultural fault lines” that separate vaguely ontological but certainly
transhistorical “civilizations.” The most significant and persistent of these clashes is the
“centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam,” which Huntington argues has
more or less defined contemporary ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ civilization.105 The imagery of
infiltration speaks to the language of warfare, though not a war between ISIS and the United
States. When McCaul and the Homeland Security Committee analysts worry that the failure of
the Dublin Regulation spells a sort of setback for Western states, they make clear that the enemy
is Muslims, the only people who present a ‘radicalization challenge.’ The language of the
‘terrorist turnpike’ places the European Union in the role of containing the states that border it: at
work here is an image of unrestricted access, coupled with the violent excess of the fleeing mob.
In failing to regulate the periphery of the European Union, the E.U. has made vulnerable the
entire West, creating room for a moral panic about the breakdown of global order.
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The logic of the clash of civilization relies on an Orientalist framing of Muslims,
particularly Muslim men, as violent and uncontrollable. In the same hearing as the one quoted
above, King reflected on the Paris attacks: “When I look at the map of Europe and the dots of the
hot spots where they have been attacked in nearly every country in Western Europe, and it’s
proportional to the populations that they’ve brought in from the Middle East and North
Africa.”106 In the imaginary built by King, there is a direct correlation between the number of
people from the Middle East and North Africa in a given location and the number of terrorist
attacks in that location. Completing the logic of Huntington’s clash of civilizations, ‘infiltration’
is followed by outright violence. King implicates the state in these attacks—it is they who have
‘brought in’ these presumably Muslim immigrants. With this, King offers a warning to U.S.
legislators about the potential dangers of Syrian refugees.
2. The uncertain state
In relating Muslim men to violent attacks across Europe, King describes the aftermath of
what policymakers might call the failure of a vetting system, without which the state is unable to
differentiate with certainty who presents a risk and who does not. A central feature of any
immigration authorization process to the United States is the background check. The most basic
checks imposed by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services include running an applicant’s
fingerprints and names through FBI databases to check for past criminal records. Syrian refugees
and asylum seekers face an in-depth interview process that includes reference checks and
biometric checks, facilitated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). Those deemed most vulnerable by UNHCR are referred to U.S.
immigration authorities, who run a set of investigations that one official has described as “the
most rigorous screening of any traveler to the U.S.”107
A central concern for legislators, however, is that this system might not be effective in
determining with certainty whether a refugee is dangerous. The revival of the West as a
civilization under threat allows the collapse of the Dublin Regulation to function as a warning
about refugees. For Representative Goodlatte, commenting during a hearing on responses to the
refugee crisis, “exactly who the individuals fleeing Syria are is also a question of immense
concern.” After all, “members of the Islamic State and foreign fighters... are now some of the
very individuals leaving the country.”108 Senator Rob Portman, in comments off the written
record at a November 19th hearing, argues that refugees must be treated with intense suspicion,
because “we need to know who they are and what their intentions are.” 109 Goodlatte enacts a
slippage of the refugee and the militant. If both flee Syria, how can the state distinguish between
the two? Portman provides the answer in pointing to identity and intentions. The problem that
these legislators confront, then, is how to discern who someone is and what they intend.
The conversation that emerges in Congress about the refugee vetting process deals with
the perceived failure of the system to fulfill its intended purpose, as demonstrated in Europe and
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therefore possible in the United States. Goodlatte follows his statement by asking Mark
Krikorian,110 who leads the anti-immigration Center for Immigration Studies, whether
government officials “have any credible way of distinguishing between refugees from Syria and
individuals who are posing as Syrian refugees.” Krikorian responds: “They can try... [but] more
than 90 percent of Syrian refugee applicants are being approved... [T]he average worldwide is 80
percent. So how stringent, really, can a vetting process be when more than 90 percent of the
people are being approved?”111 Krikorian moves fluidly from questioning bureaucratic efficacy
to insinuating that Syrian refugees are being treated with leniency. It seem that he builds from an
assumption that enough refugees present a risk of terrorism that a certain portion of them must be
denied entry—managing risk requires an understanding that everyone presents risk. Krikorian’s
implication is not just the vetting system, as a tool of risk management, may fail in the future, but
that is has already failed.
Such language is often couched in reminders that the United States is a benefactor in
refugee admissions. Portman follows his question about refugee vetting with repeated assurances
that “we’re the most generous country in the world, and thank God we are.”112 For Portman, the
United States’ generosity as a receiving state in some cases allows for a certain hostility toward
immigrants in other cases: humanitarianism provides a distraction from and justification for
immigration restrictionism and the treatment of Syrian refugees as sites of risk. Representative
Jeff Duncan offers a rather more rhetorical call to action: “We should do everything we can to
make sure that elements of evil are not introduced, due to our compassionate hearts, into the
neighborhoods, the towns, the cities, and the States that we represent in this great Nation.”113 The
Manichean tones of Duncan’s statement, almost certainly a reference to the idiom of the Bush
doctrine, define action in the face of international crisis not as humanitarian aid but as a turn to
self-preservation. Compassion, it seems, represents its own form of risk.
Congressional uncertainty discourse deals with the apparent impossibility to uncover the
motives of Syrian refugees. As a House report puts it, “refugees and economic migrants have
been able to provide false documents, names, nationalities, and other information to authorities
who have limited means to cross-check and validate the information.” 114 Even beyond the scope
of the information that is potentially falsifiable, the report’s separation of ‘refugees’ and
‘economic migrants’ points to a mistrust with the nature of the asylum claim itself. If someone
can provide fake documents, and therefore a false history, how can one know whether they are
truly fleeing persecution? Refugee policy is premised on a certain exceptionalism: refugees and
asylees are vulnerable more than anyone else, a division effected by labeling people who are not
able to prove persecution as ‘economic migrants.’
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Talal Asad argues that scholars of terrorism115 often rely on a “forensic reading of
motive”: they attempt to (re)construct the reason for a terrorist to act in a particular way. Liberal
theorists of violence tend to rely on what Asad labels ‘motive’ as a characteristic with which to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts of violence. For the modern subject, Asad
writes, it makes little sense that an actor should “choose to justify their violence in terms of a
discursive religious tradition.” Religious motives must be treated with a good deal of suspicion,
if not outright hostility. The religious language with which Asad deals is Islam; presumably, the
story is rather different in dealing with justifications that draw on Judeo-Christian values,
whether explicitly or implicitly.116 In other words, the acts of religious subjects, particularly
Muslim subjects, are rendered somewhat suspect for the liberal modern subject.
Thus Syrian refugees, if not otherwise clarified as Christian, face a certain degree of
suspicion with regard to the very legitimacy of their claims for seeking refuge. McCaul points to
the importance of “roadblocks to keep terrorists from entering the United States” through strict
refugee policy that would “allo[w] legitimate refugees who are not a threat to be resettled
appropriately.”117 McCaul’s language carries significant weight: only ‘legitimate’ refugees, those
people who do not present a threat to the United States, will be resettled. He implies a separation
not only between refugee and immigrant but between terrorist and refugee. Here enters the great
frustration of the uncertain state in this Congressional discourse: if the extensive refugee vetting
process cannot uncover the true identities and intentions of the Syrian refugee, how can it
prevent terrorists from pretending to be refugees in entering the United States?
3. “Quantify the risk to the American society”
The tension over the failure of the vetting system operates through the securitization of
the refugee and the imposition of risk management. Taken together, these two moves allow the
uncertain state to act as if it were certain. Loosely defined, securitization is the process by which
things that are not implicitly related to national security becomes addressed through the language
and logics of national security. The Congressional discourse considered here engages in a classic
act of securitization, with the refugee cast as the threat. This act of securitization leveraged
against the figure of the refugee does not occur in a void: it is effected alongside the intrusion of
security discourse into other immigration policy conversations.118 For instance, Krikorian’s
image of a barely effective vetting process and McCaul’s reference to ‘roadblocks’ rely on the
configuration of the border as porous.
The image of a failing homeland security is facilitated in part by the raising of concern
about the border security of the United States (and a call for greater militarization thereof).
Deepa Fernandes points to the move made by anti-immigration members of Congress after 9/11
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to “declar[e] that protecting the homeland against terrorism was primarily an immigration issue.”
One Representative, Tom Trancredo of Colorado, “spoke of Islamic prayer rugs and a diary
written in Arabic that had been found in the scrublands of the U.S.-Mexico border,” though
without providing evidence.119 Tancredo builds of the fear of ‘cultural invasion’ that some
scholars, including Huntington, link to Latinx immigration into a panic over militarized
Muslims. In this sense, the securitization of the refugee in the contemporary era does not begin
with these policy conversations about Syrian refugees but with the emergence of border security
discourse in the 1990s and the corresponding fear of the ‘immigrant-terrorist.’
Risk management is perhaps best considered as an attempt to identify and mark factors
that indicate risk. It is generously coupled with the expansion of biometric technology use, which
“focus[es] on the physical or physiological characteristics of the human body” and “transform[s]
[them] into measurable data.” Theorists of risk management120 tend to draw contours around
what sorts of risk are calculable by state actors. That is, most theorists operate from the
understanding that some risk factors are knowable and some unknowable. Benjamin Muller
argues that the “preoccupation with verification/authentication requires [a person] to resemble
this digital data” to “over-code identity” in the eyes of state.121 In other words, the state’s
mechanisms for understanding those who cross the borders are increasingly biological, such that
non-biological and non-observable identifiers are suspect. Risk management as a framework for
analyzing migration effects a biopolitical engagement with immigrants and refugees: they are
described by the calculations of the state, rendered into probabilities of danger.
When insufficient biometric data is available, the state cannot calculate risk. The reliance
on risk management thus produces a demand for data, rendered urgent through the language of
emergency brought by securitization. The words of Representative Trey Gowdy at a House
hearing offer an apt case study: “Administration officials responsible for national security and
public safety, Mr. Speaker, have repeatedly warned us they cannot vet failed nation-states. They
cannot do background investigations where there is no database.”122 Gowdy opened with the
language of urgency, referencing (anonymous) bureaucrats who have taken on the responsibility
of the state and its people. These officials are worried, Gowdy warned, that their work is
hindered by the collapse of the Syrian government. Because Syria is a ‘failed nation-state,’ there
is no data available.
Gowdy points toward the foreign policy concerns that underlie Congressional discussions
of the Syrian refugee crisis. Immigration and refugee policy is in the case of Syrian refugees, and
perhaps always, steeped in the logics of foreign policy. The border is not written only in relation
to the particular territory it contains, but in relation to those spaces that are constituted as outside,
beyond, or excluded.123 Take, for example, the near-constant presence of foreign policy experts
on Congressional panels on immigration and refugee policy. Seth Jones, one such foreign policy
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expert who has affiliated with the RAND Corporation, compared Syria to Iraq and Afghanistan,
where “we had large databases with biometric information and names, based on people who
were coming into prison systems and checkpoints,” In Syria, however, “we just have gaps.”124
Jones provides a foundation through which to relate immigration restrictionism and foreign
interventionism. In invoking the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Jones seems to imply
that conditions of explicit war create surveillance apparatuses that allow the state to reduce the
risk of refugee entry. Imperialism is lent the veneer of humanitarianism.
The call for surveillance centering on refugees comes with regard to Syrians in the United
States as well. In a long exchange with Anne C. Richards of the State Department’s Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, Representative Lamar Smith argues in favor of the
extensive tracking of Syrian refugees who have entered the country. After confirming that the
State Department monitors all refugees for the first three months, primarily to ease integration,
Smith asks pointedly whether “they [are] treated any differently than other refugees.” When
Richards reports that they are not, Smith responds:
You say Syrians are less of a threat, even though we’ve had testimony from the FBI Director that
of all of the cohorts of refugees, including Iraqi refugees, we have less information about the
Syrian refugees than others? ... They may not have a record of terrorism. They may be would-be
terrorists; they may be terrorists in training.125

Smith draws on the language of uncertainty and risk in laying out his claim for the greater
surveillance of refugees within the United States. Any Syrian refugee might be a ‘would-be
terrorist,’ therefore all Syrian refugees must be monitored. The need to calculate risk demands
greater data collection, again framed in references to security and emergency.
Given these gaps in information, the uncertain state does not have many identifiers with
which to regulate entry. As discussed above, Congressional discourse writes identities as
falsifiable and intentions as uncoverable. The lack of biometric data, meanwhile, prevents the
state from managing the population through the infrastructure of the biopolitical state, which
tracks bodies and behavior far beyond the scope of the border security interview. In considering
Syrian refugees, then, the state’s elaborate apparatuses of control serve no function. The refugee
can only be considered by the basic categories of national origin, race, ethnicity, age, gender,
religion, and so on. In performing risk calculations on a population that is unified in national
origin and sorted according to age, gender, and marital status by the UNHCR bureaucracy, the
only identifier that emerges on which to make judgements is religion.
4. Locked doors and those most vulnerable
The debate around H.R. 4038, the American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of
2015 or “SAFE Act,” offers a clear view of the turn to religion as the only clear identifier in
Congressional discourse about Syrian refugees. A close reading of the Congressional Record that
details the consideration of the bill shows an explicit and tacit use of religious coding in risk
management. The Record details the introduction of the SAFE Act to the House floor, with
introductions from its Republican cosponsors and a rather lively debate. The debate followed
party lines, and this section of the Record includes the consideration of a Democratic
counterproposal, the Secure Refugee Process Act of 2015. Representatives in the debate seemed
to cite almost the exact same scripts depending on their party alignment: Republican supporters
reference feelings of insecurity and terror, threats to US homes and families, and Obama
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administration foreign policy failures; the Democrat opposition reference the moral obligation to
save women and children.
The SAFE Act proposes the imposition of significantly more stringent evaluation
requirements on all refugees entering the United States from Syria and Iraq. The most significant
change would have required that every Syrian and Iraqi refugee be certified by unanimous
consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the FBI, and the Director of
National Intelligence. One representative estimates that such a review would take 2 hours per
refugee file. The counterproposal imposes slightly less severe evaluation requirements for all
refugees, not just those from Syria and Iraq; restricts the involvement of the DHS Secretary to a
cursory evaluation of each file; and removes intelligence directors from the conversation. The
Record concludes with the rejection of the counterproposal (180 in favor, 244 against, 9
abstentions) and the passage of the SAFE Act out of the House (289 in favor, 137 against, 8
abstentions). The SAFE Act eventually died in committee in the Senate. 126
The Republican testimony in favor of H.R. 4038 offer a host of images that evoke the
home. Representative Hal Rogers calls for the United States “to eradicate the threats posed here
and abroad... to ensure that Americans can tuck in their children at night with a feeling of
security that they will be waking up tomorrow morning for school free from fear.” His colleague
Jeb Hensarling calls for the House of Representatives to acknowledge that “today is not the day
to share our territory, not until and unless these people can be properly vetted to ensure they
don’t threaten our families.” Following his invocation of neighborhoods and towns as quoted
above, Duncan offers an attempt at a charming adage: “We lock our doors, not because we hate
the people on the outside. We lock our doors because we love the people on the inside.”127
Rogers and Hensarling justify the expansion of security by invoking an apparent threat to
the home and family. Their rhetoric presents Syrian refugees as a physical danger to families,
especially those with children in the United States. The families who must be protected are
almost certainly white and Christian: as Junaid Rana notes, the various historical formations of
Islam in European and U.S. popular thought are those that “threate[n] the maintenance of a
racial-religious order based in the idea of white Christian supremacy.”128 Such a reading is made
quite explicit by the demand of Representative Dana Rohrbacher that “Christians should get the
priority” in refugee admissions because “today the Christians in the Middle East are targeted for
genocide.”129 The threat lies with Muslim refugees from Syria, who may be complicit in the
persecution of Christians that Rohrbacher centers, Of course, the imagery of the War on Drugs is
at play here is well, a call to white America’s paranoia of Black men forcing their way into the
home. It is against the man of color that the door is locked.
The comments from Democrats against the bill call for the protection of refugee women
and children by a humane patriarchal state. Representative Zoe Lofgren calls for leniency toward
Syrian refugees because “the overwhelming majority are children and widows who have been
victims of torture, who have seen their husbands beheaded.” In a letter submitted to the
Congressional Record, former Directors of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Michael
Chertoff comments that officials “consider only the most vulnerable—particularly survivors of
violence and torture, those with severe medical conditions, and women and children—for
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potential admittance to the U.S.”130 Lofgren, Napolitano, and Chertoff located Syrian and Iraqi
women in spaces that are perpetually violent. Women see their husbands beheaded, rendering
their trauma one described in the language of what happens to the men around them. The
language here also raises the question of who exactly is performing these acts of violence—here
looms the specter of the violent Muslim man.
The language of the Democrats engages in a fundamental denial of agency of the women
imagined under incredible threat. Pardis Mahdavi argues that the repetition of the phrase ‘women
and children’ effects a sort of confusion of language by which women are infantilized: ‘women
and children’ becomes ‘women-as-children.’131 Women are in need of saving by the state,
especially those women who no longer have husbands. Take Representative Barbara Jackson
Lee’s characterization of Republicans as saying “turn your back on children, women, and old
people broken and bent,” as compared to her own assertion that “America’s values can parallel
the love, respect, and commitment to the national security of this Nation.”132 Jackson Lee
(somewhat confusedly) seems to argue that security concerns and the savior complex go hand in
hand, ignoring the reality that commitment to U.S. national security is one of the main
justifications that the state provides for the very military engagements that produce refugees.
The debate over the American SAFE Act neatly draws together refugee policy, foreign
policy, and national security. Refugees from Syria and Iraq become a sort of receptacle for the
anxiety over the external threats of terrorism. The family emerges as a central site of concern for
both proponents and opponents of the bill. The Republican testimony in favor of H.R. 4038
offers a host of images that evoke the home, calling upon sleeping children and locked front
doors. The families who must be protected are almost certainly Christian, heterosexual, and
white. The comments from Democrats against the bill, meanwhile, call for the protection of
refugee women and children by a humane patriarchal state. The concern here lies with people
who are ‘vulnerable’ in the current setting of refugee camps.
Both scripts pass no reference to young Muslim men. This elision is telling—I suggest
that it indicates precisely who the threat is. Of course, the violent young brown man is a standard
figure of threat in narratives about Islam, not to mention a familiar specter raised throughout U.S.
history in representing the danger presented by Black masculinity. The tacit inclusion of this
figure in Congressional discourse about Syrian refugees suggests that the uncertain state can only
act with certainty in refugee admissions when religion is deployed as an identifying
characteristic. Circling back to the question raised by King at the start of this chapter, the logics
of this Congressional turn to Islamophobia as risk management become clear: to quantify the risk
to American society requires a focus on young Muslim men.
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IV. Plainly-Worded Statements:
Judicial Contestations of Islamophobia under Trump
Donald J. Trump ran his campaign on the promise to leverage the power of the
Presidential office against Muslims. Take, for instance, his oft-quoted call “for a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can
figure out what is going on,” made only sixth months after the announcement of his campaign
and at the very beginning of his meteoric rise to power. The very title of the press release—
“Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” 133—speaks to an essentialized and restrictive
immigration policy, one that can separate and identify people according to religious beliefs. The
immigration policy agenda of the Trump administration’s first months includes two executive
orders that do not mention Islam or Muslims once and yet are clearly intended to actualize
Trump’s commitment to ‘preventing Muslim immigration.’ These orders, both of which were
almost immediately branded as a ‘Muslim ban,’ forbid entry and restrict refugee admission from
a set of Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East.
In this chapter, I examine the legal contestations of the Trump executive orders, dealing
primarily with two major cases filed by states attorneys general in the past two months, State of
Washington and State of Minnesota v. Donald J. Trump and State of Hawaii and Ismail Elshikh
v. Donald J. Trump. The district court ruling in Washington blocked the first iteration of the
Trump executive order, while that of Hawaii blocked the original ban’s replacement. In turning
from Congressional ideations of the Muslim-as-terrorist to executive and judicial contestations of
whether exactly it is legal to regulate all Muslims as terrorists in immigration policy, I follow the
progression of a set of ideas from discussion to actualization.
With this in mind, I focus on the language of risk and religion in the legal briefs, oral
arguments, and court documents of the two contemporary cases. I chart out two separate but
related arguments in this chapter. First, I overview the progression of Washington and Hawaii
through the courts up until April 1, 2017 and explore the ways in which Islam is produced in the
discussion over the two cases. I suggest that a close reading of the federal government’s
arguments show that the Trump administration operates under an extreme logic of risk
management that renders all Muslims as potential terrorists. In this sense, the Trump executive
orders represent a sort of culmination of the logics discussed in previous chapters: if the only
unifying characteristic of all potential terrorists is that each potential terrorist is Muslim, then the
most effective means of managing risk is to ban all Muslims.
The second argument of the chapter deals with the religion clauses of the Constitution.
These begin the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...”134 The Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause both played a role in Washington and Hawaii, though the Establishment Clause
is more central. I compare these two contemporary cases to two relatively recent rulings on
religious discrimination against Muslims in post-9/11 immigration policing. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
and the cases consolidated under Turkmen v. Ashcroft alleged religious discrimination on the
parts of senior Bush administration officials, arguing that federal agents violated the Free
Exercise rights of Muslim detainees. Drawing from the substantial secondary literature on the
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two cases, I show that First Amendment claims in Iqbal and Turkmen found little success in the
courts, in part because a lack of evidence at the highest levels of policy decision-making that
indicated clear intent to discriminate on the basis of religion. I suggest that the relative (albeit
preliminary) successes of the Establishment Clause arguments in Washington and Hawaii in
relation to the religion clauses in Iqbal and Turkmen follow the overt securitization of all Muslim
immigrants. The courts in Washington and Hawaii suggest that if the U.S. government indeed
conceives of Islam as a marker of risk for any person crossing the border and writes policy on
that understanding then the government is not respecting its constitutional duty toward the
establishment of religion.
1. The Muslim ban in the courts
On January 27, 2017, seven days after his inauguration, Trump signed Executive Order
13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” In
doing so, he instituted sweeping changes to immigrant and refugee policy, most notably a ban on
entry of all immigrants and nonimmigrant visitors from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen.135 The executive order restructured the refugee system considerably, by suspending
all refugee admissions into the United States for 120 days, limiting refugee entry to 50,000
people a year, and banning the entry of Syrian refugees. E.O. 13769 further declared the
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security would “prioritize refugee claims made by individuals
on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a
minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”136
The release of E.O. 13769 saw hundreds of people detained in airports across the United
States, among them legal permanent residents, Iraqi interpreters issued visas for service in
combat, young children, and elders. Implementation proved to be rushed and confused, with
some border agents expressing that communication from the Trump administration lacked clarity
or guidance, especially with regard to legal permanent residents (LPR) and family separation.
Almost immediately after the order was released and as soon as detentions were reported,
protestors filled airports across the country.137 Meanwhile, attorneys filed dozens of cases against
E.O. 13769 in the days that followed its issuance.138
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Among those cases was State of Washington and State of Minnesota v. Donald J. Trump,
filed by Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson on January 30, 2017 and joined a day later
by the state of Minnesota. The case brought to the U.S. District Court of Western Washington a
number of charges on behalf of state residents: a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
claim on discriminatory intent and a Due Process Clause claim; a First Amendment
Establishment Clause claim on unlawful preference for certain religions; claims drawing from
various immigration policy statutes on discriminatory visa procedures, denial of asylum, and
protecting entrants under threat of torture; an exercise of religion claim under the Religious
Freedoms Restoration Act; and two claims of procedural violations.139 After hearing oral
arguments on February 3, Judge James Robart issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that
delayed the enforcement of the order nationwide. The Trump administration immediately
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a stay on the TRO. A panel of
Ninth Circuit Judges William Canby, Richard Clifton, and Michelle Friedland heard arguments
on February 7 and issued a unanimous decision in favor of the states on February 9.140 Rather
than continue to an en banc proceeding with the full panel of the Ninth Circuit, the Trump
administration requested a delay pending their issue of a replacement executive order.
Executive Order 13780 revoked and replaced E.O. 13769 after being signed by Trump on
March 6, 2017. E.O. 13780 has the same name as its predecessor and indeed spends a number of
paragraphs marking a spirited defense of E.O. 13769, including a country-by-country overview
of “some of the conditions in six of the previously designated countries that demonstrate why
their nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States.”141 The
new executive order maintains a ban on entry for individuals from Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen,142 though Iraq is removed from this list. E.O. 13780 includes a number of
exceptions to this ban, namely for LPRs and people granted asylee or refugee status, as well as a
detailed explanation of case-by-case waivers. The temporary suspension and downsizing of the
refugee program as implemented by E.O. 13769 remain, while the steps taken to ban Syrian
refugees and prioritize religious-based persecution do not.
Hawaii’s attorney general filed State of Hawaii and Ismail Elshikh v. Donald J. Trump a
day after the Trump administration released E.O. 13780, likely due to the weeks of warning that
a new executive order was forthcoming. Brought to the U.S. District Court of Hawaii, the state
filed a number of claims along with Ismail Elshikh, a plaintiff who is an LPR from Egypt and an
imam, along with his family. They alleged: First Amendment Establishment Clause violations
with harms to Elshikh, his family, and mosque community; Fifth Amendment claims citing the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses; violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act;
infringements of the free exercise of religion as protected by the Religious Freedoms Restoration
Act; and several procedural violations.143 Judge Derrick Watson issued a Temporary Restraining
Order, a finding in favor of the claims of the state and Elshikh, on March 15, which he converted
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to a more permanent injunction on March 29. As of March 30, the Trump administration filed
documents to appeal the injunction to the Ninth Circuit.144
2. Risk assessments and (un)reviewability
As mentioned above, the Trump administration’s approach represents something of a
culmination of the use of risk management logics in immigration and refugee policy. In arguing
against the Washington v. Trump TRO, counsel for the administration Michelle Bennett argued
that the “rationale for the order was not only [the 9/11 attacks],” but “was to protect the United
States from the potential for terrorism.” Bennet’s claim came directly after Justice Robart asked
if there had been terrorist attacks in the United States by refugees or other immigrants from the
seven countries listed. 145 In other words, the counsel provided as evidence of attacks that
immigrants from these Muslim-majority countries represent the risk of terrorist attack.
The oral arguments brought by the Trump administration in the Washington appeal
deploy the logic of national security in arguing that such risk assessment is essentially beyond
question. August Flentje, arguing for the federal government, described the appeal as motivated
by “the district court’s decision [to] override the president’s national security judgement about
the level of risk that is acceptable.” In this same conversation, Flentje cites evidence that he
reports the government cannot include in the record. In other words, the government assesses
risk through access to knowledge that must be presumed to be decisive simply because the
knowledge cannot be shared and therefore cannot be evaluated by outside parties. The
administration’s risk assessment cannot be questioned: responding to Judge Friedland’s question
on whether “the president’s decision in that regard is unreviewable,” Flentje responds with a
simple affirmative.146
Bennett and Flentje deploy the logic of emergency and exception as a claim that the
courts cannot review the Trump administration’s assessment of risk. The mechanics of that
assessment are obfuscated because they are matters of ‘national security,’ a phrase that further
invokes governance through exception. Legally speaking, Flentje has little ground on which to
stand. The Ninth Circuit roundly dismisses any idea that the courts cannot question national
security decisions through the citation of a significant body of case law.147 The counsel’s
invocation of national security, however, indicates a discursive willingness to discard one of the
most basic premises of U.S. government, that of judicial review, in the name of a politics of
exception. Flentje’s argument seems to embody the extreme of Ole Wæver’s assertion that
security politics are that which is separate from ‘normal’ politics,148 deploying risk as the
grounds on which to establish a state of exception almost beyond the reach of the juridical.
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3. “I’m talking territory instead of Muslim”
The legal challenges against E.O. 13769 and E.O. 13780 rely in part on the argument that
the treatment of all Muslims as sites of risk in executive action violate the religion clauses of the
Constitution. Washington v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump make two specific claims with regard
to religion. First, counsels for the states argued that the ban on entry from certain countries and
the changes to refugee admissions represents a violation of the Establishment Clause. They
frame Sections 3 and 5 of E.O. 13769 and Section 2 of E.O. 13780 as “intended to disfavor Islam
and favor Christianity.” Second, the counsels argued that the travel restrictions violate the free
exercise protections of the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA). RFRA protects religion
in the public sphere, which the states suggest would be extended to planned travel for religious
purposes.149 The Establishment Clause arguments prove to hold the greatest interest to the courts.
The plaintiffs’ arguments in both cases extended beyond purely constitutional grounds,
however. Counsels included reference to “statements made by [the Trump administration]
concerning [the] intent and application” of the Executive Order with regard to Muslims.150 The
state’s case in Hawaii, in particular, tracks Trump’s language in describing a potential travel ban
in overtly discriminatory language to language that is “facially neutral.”151 The state’s central
claim is that the past language describing a policy move should clarify the intent of the eventual
result. For instance, the complaint in Hawaii quotes in full a comment from Trump describing
the difference between E.O. 13769 and E.O. 13780: “I don’t think it’s a rollback [of the original
executive order]. In fact, you could say it’s an expansion. I’m looking now at territories. People
were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember
this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”152 The complaint
in Hawaii argues that evidence like this proves any nation-of-origin language in E.O. 13780
serves to mask anti-Muslim intent. As Noah Purcell, arguing for the states, puts it in Washington,
the burden of the plaintiffs is “to prove that a desire to discriminate based on religion was one
motivating factor in the adoption of the order.”153 In other words, the states sought to establish
that the bans were grounded in exclusionary intent.
The Trump administration’s responses to these arguments emphasized the neutrality of
the Executive Orders. Neither E.O. 13769 nor E.O. 1370 mentions Islam or religion more
generally. Bennett argued for the Trump administration in Washington that “distinctions based
on nationality, which is what the Executive Order does, in the immigration context are
completely valid and legitimate and do not violate the Constitution.”154 The nation-of-origin
entry restrictions, according to the administration, are simply that, regardless of any
disproportionate impact on certain religious groups. Similarly, one of the administration’s
primary responses to an Establishment Clause challenge to E.O. 13769 stressed that the
“accommodation for minority religions within each country participating in the refugee
program” applies to every country in the world, not only the seven Muslim-majority countries
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singled out in the ban.155 Because the travel restrictions and changes to refugee program were
facially neutral with regard to religion, the counsels for administration argued, no Establishment
Clause violation could take place.
While the TRO issued by Robart in Washington offers little significant consideration of
the religion clause claims, 156 the approach taken by Watson in the Hawaii TRO suggests that a
policy’s lack of reference to religion does not offer any sort of exemption from Establishment
Clause review. Watson applied what is known as the Lemon test for legislation that deals with
religion, developed in the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman and clarified in further cases. The
Lemon test has three so-called prongs: the purpose prong, which states that a statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; the effects prong, which states that a statute’s primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and the excessive entanglement prong, which declares that a
statute not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” If a statute fails any
part of the Lemon test, it violates the Establishment Clause.157 Watson argued that E.O. 13780
violated the secular purpose prong. Citing the disproportionate impact of the travel ban on
Muslims, Watson concluded “it would therefore be no paradigmatic leap to conclude that
targeting these countries likewise targets Islam.”158 He further argued the “plainly-worded
statements” of Trump and his advisors referencing the religious intent of the travel ban “betray
the Executive Order’s stated purpose.”159
In the debate before the appellate panel in Washington, the counsel for the states frames
secular purpose as a parallel to active religious discrimination. Judges Clifton, Friedland, and
Canby pushed Purcell, arguing again for the states, and Flentje, arguing for the federal
government, to clarify their argumentation over the Establishment Clause. When prompted by
the panel to identify the best tool to evaluate the Establishment Clause claim, Purcell cites
Larson v. Valente, a 1982 ruling that dealt with a Minnesota law that required charitable
organizations soliciting funds to register written with the state government unless they were
religious organizations that drew more than half their solicitations from members. A religious
organization that did not fit the fifty-percent rule successfully sued on Establishment Clause
grounds.160 For Purcell, the similarity between the law in Larson and E.O. 13769 is that both
represent “a facially neutral law” that ultimately “distinguish[ed] between [religious
denominations] in a way that favored some and not others.”161 Though Purcell mentioned in an
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aside that he expected the state’s case in Washington to succeed in the Lemon test as well as
through Larson, his shift to the latter case emphasizes that the E.O. 13769 not only fails a secular
purpose test but also actively disfavors certain religious practice despite policy language that
does not reference religion.
4. Religious discrimination and the post-9/11 Constitution
The citation of the Establishment Clause in Washington and Hawaii mark the two cases
as unique among the body of legal challenges to profiling on the basis of race and religion in
post-9/11 immigration and immigrant detention policy. That Robart, Watson, and the appellate
panel of the Ninth Circuit found such claims compelling represents a significant departure from
previous rulings on religious Constitutional claims after 9/11. Previous allegations of religious
discrimination related to the mass profiling of immigrants by federal authorities have found little
ground in the courts. The religious discrimination claims in Washington and Hawaii differ from
previous post-9/11 cases not only in terms of their (albeit limited) successes but in that their
presentation of Constitutional violations of religious liberty draw from a dramatically different
set of claims and evidence.
The majority of cases brought against the government on the grounds of religious
profiling after 9/11 have invoked the Free Exercise Clause, if the First Amendment is referenced
at all. The most significant of these are likely the 2009 Supreme Court decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal
and the cases consolidated under Turkmen v. Ashcroft, now more properly known as Ziglar v.
Abbasi, argued in front of the Supreme Court in January and pending decision.162 Iqbal and
Turkmen were both responses to the wave of immigrant detention in the aftermaths of the attack.
The plaintiffs in the cases were arrested in the first year after the attacks and detained for
unauthorized presence, an immigrant crime. During the detention process, government agents
physically and verbally abused the plaintiffs, denied them due process, and refused to let them
pray, eat halal meat, or access a copy of the Quran. Plaintiffs in both cases reported clear antiMuslim animus in the detention process, though the evidence in Turkmen would prove to be
more clearly recorded and accessible to the courts than in Iqbal.163
Facially, the circumstances of Iqbal and Turkmen bear some similarity to those of
Washington and Hawaii: executive action orders large-scale profiling that targets immigrants and
refugees on the basis of race and religion. While First Amendment challenges to executive
authority deploying the religion clauses are certainly not common, Iqbal and Turkmen has no
lack of legal precedent.164 Both cases assert that the federal government enabled Islamophobia
through the political logics of counter-terrorism and homeland security. The 2001 and 2002 cases
deal with detention and sometimes deportation of those already in the country, however, while
the 2017 cases challenge restrictions of entry and detentions in the airport. The plaintiffs in Iqbal
and Turkmen held that actions taken by federal agents under executive authority prevented them
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from the free exercise of their religion though they did not seek Establishment Clause
interventions.
Ultimately, the courts were not receptive to the religious discrimination arguments in
Iqbal and Turkmen. The Supreme Court ruling in Iqbal declined to consider the damages implied
by a First Amendment violation enacted by federal authorities, in part out of a refusal to hold
government authorities responsible for the individual discriminatory intent of federal
employees.165 The Court’s response to allegations that policing under the Bush administration
discriminated on the basis of religion, race, and national origin, meanwhile, strikes a strongly
conciliatory tone:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted
themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda
was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his
Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy
was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. ...the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing
that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as “of
high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin. This the complaint fails to do.166

The majority opinion elides disparate religious and racial impact with a veneer of common sense.
The rhetorical question here seems to be: if all the attackers were Arab Muslims, why is it a
‘surprise’ that those who are detained are Arab Muslims as well, even given a neutral policy? (It
is worth noting that none of the plaintiffs in Iqbal were of Arab descent and that many of those
detained in the aftermaths of the attack were not Arab or Muslim.) Indeed, the Court operated
under the presumption, given the lack of admissible evidence otherwise, that the Bush
administration’s actions were neutral with regard to race and religion.167
Shirin Sinnar argues that the tone of this passage establishes a several discursive link that
excuse racial-religious profiling in government immigration policy. First, the Court seems to
imply that the composition of al-Qaeda and of those detained after 9/11 are causally linked. That
is, the opinion offers Arab Muslim criminality as an explanation for the disparate impact of the
detentions and deportations. Second, Sinnar suggests that the majority opinion implies “that even
if law enforcement officials did take into account ethnicity and religion in their investigation,
such considerations were legitimate because of the ethnic and religious composition of the
hijackers and al Qaeda,” providing normative grounds for profiling.168 In the context of
Leila McNeill, “The Role of Individuals Discrimination in Free Exercise Claims: Putting Iqbal in Its Place,”
Missouri Law Review 75, no. 3 (June 1, 2010), 1017-19. The problem in Iqbal lay with the application of what is
known as a Bivens course of action. The Supreme Court set precedent in a 1971 ruling that “implied cause of action
may be maintained against federal officials for violations of federal constitutional rights,” originally relating to
Fourth Amendment protections. That is, a Bivens course of action allows a plaintiff to contest constitutional
violations by specific officers. While the Court in Iqbal assumed that a Bivens claim could be extended to First
Amendment violations, it ruled that Bevins did not extend supervisory liability. In other words, the Court held that
senior Bush administration officials such as John Ashcroft could not be held liable for constitutional violations
committed by federal agents unless the plaintiffs proved that the senior officials demonstrated clear discriminatory
intent on the basis of religion. See also Dawinder S. Sidhu, “First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest
Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination,” Buffalo Law Review 58, no. 2
(April 17, 2010): 432, 468-9.
166
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court of the United States 2009), 682.
167
Vivek Mittal, “Using Iqbal in Iqbal: Exploiting Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians after September 11,” UCLA
Asian Pacific American Law Journal 15, no. 1 (2009): 130-131.
168
Shirin Sinnar, “The Lost Story of Iqbal,” 389-390, emphasis original.
165

45

violations of constitutional religious freedoms, Sinnar’s argument that about Court’s causal claim
and normative claim points to a juridical framework that demands explicit and legally plausible
evidence of profiling on the basis of religion.
The Second Circuit ruled in 2015 that the plaintiffs in Turkmen could proceed with their
due process, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment search claims, denying qualified
immunity to many of the Bush administration officials. The free exercise claim was, however,
discarded for all plaintiffs.169 The reason given was literally straight out of Iqbal: “the Supreme
Court has ‘not found an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause’ and ‘has
declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding the First Amendment.’”170 The appellate court
cited and quoted from Iqbal to discard the plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims. This despite
what Vivek Mittal refers to as a concentrated effort by the petitioners in Turkmen “to distinguish
Iqbal for nearly every cause of action” in the arguments about religious discrimination. Mittal
argues that the court in Turkmen yielded to the “symbolic power of the Supreme Court” despite
significant factual evidence of discrimination present in Turkmen that were not accessible in the
Iqbal complaint.171
The First Amendment claims in Washington and Hawaii are significant, then, in that they
are unusually successful. To be clear, Washington only preceded through appellate review before
E.O. 13769 was revoked and Hawaii has only been heard by a district court. Hawaii has recently
been appealed to the Ninth Circuit and will likely be taken to the Supreme Court.172 In other
words, my use of ‘success’ here must be taken with a grain of salt in that review has been
primarily restricted to the lower courts. That being said, how might we account for the difference
between the judicial lifespans of Washington and Hawaii and Iqbal and Turkmen?
The targets of religious discrimination, and therefore the grounds on which to make
claims of Constitutional violations, are different in the post-9/11 cases and the 2017 cases. The
plaintiffs in Iqbal and Turkmen were all men on nonimmigrant visas swept up in the wave of
policing after 9/11. The arrests targeted men of South Asian or Middle Eastern origin and
presumed to be Muslim, using tactics that deployed the juridical logics of profiling and detention
perfected through legal defenses of the policies of the War on Drugs.173 Iqbal and Turkmen
named as unconstitutional the actions of federal authorities—specifically, the interactions
between immigration authorities and detained individuals. The legal groundwork for such a
challenge proved unsteady. The 2017 cases, in contrast, cast a highly visible and much-discussed
dragnet that detained hundreds of people in a single day as religious discrimination that followed
overtly anti-Muslim discourse. The Trump administration promised to deploy E.O. 13769 and
E.O. 13780 as the starting point for the mass profiling of Muslims.
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I suggest the expansion of the figure of the terrorist Muslim that I track elsewhere in this
thesis, and the resulting shift in policy action, may account for the change in religious
discrimination claim. The rise in blatant Islamophobia that accompanied these changes created
political conditions in which a presidential candidate could blame ‘all Muslims’ for a blame,
rather than the more moderated (though no less harmful) claims against ‘bad Muslims’ or ‘fascist
Islam’ that characterized post-9/11 discourse.174 The plaintiffs in the 2017 cases leveraged
Trump’s statements to fill the gap of ‘facts plausibly showing’ religious discrimination in Iqbal
and Turkmen. Indeed, though the complaints in Washington and Hawaii referenced free exercise
infringements, these played a minimal role during oral arguments and were referenced only
lightly in the decisions of the courts. The expansion of religious discrimination from those
targeted for and during detention as ‘bad Muslims’ to all Muslims entering the United States
shifted the Constitutional stakes of legal challenges.
5. Reading religion in Trump’s United States
The courts responded to the administration “talking territory instead of Muslim” by
issuing orders that suggested an understanding of the power of the ‘talk’ that drives
policymaking. The arguments in and decisions that followed Washington and Hawaii cast in
sharp relief the material covered in the previous two chapters of this thesis. I mean this not only
in regards to my main argument about speech that securitize various figures of the Muslim
immigrant and contribute to the metonymy of Muslim-as-terrorist. The courts call attention here
to the very specific work that anti-Muslim political speech does in writing policy that abstracts
Islam through nation-of-origin restrictions: to paraphrase the arguments of the defendants in
Washington and Hawaii, how could the Executive Orders be anti-Muslim when so much of the
body of post-9/11 immigrant and refugee policy have used similar methods of exclusion?
The courts’ response might be summarized as talk matters. This presents an opportunity
to rethink the role that religion plays in assessing post-9/11 Islamophobia. As I have discussed in
previous chapters, many scholars examining Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks focus on the
racialization of Muslims and the violence enacted on Muslim bodies. The decisions in
Washington and Hawaii, however, rely on First Amendment claims, along with Equal Protection
Clause and RFRA claims with regard to religious practice. Counsels alleging Constitutional
violations made little reference to racial profiling in the court cases. To be clear, the mechanics
by which the orders were implemented likely involved no small degree of profiling or physical
characteristics, given the well-documented history of profiling in airports. In focusing on
‘plainly-worded statements,’ the district courts and Ninth Circuit panel rule less on those
implementation realities of racial profiling and more on the language of religious discrimination
that produced such implementation.
Junaid Rana describes discrimination against Muslims in the language of anti-Muslim
racism, rather than Islamophobia, in order to situate the politics of the post-9/11 moment in the
broader history of U.S. racism.175 The attention that Rana pays to structural racism, the process
by which the interactions between political institutions across time restrict and racialize being, 176
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is important work in that it situates anti-Muslim immigrant policy discourse, to use one example,
with past histories and present realities of racism against African American Muslims. The link
between the post-9/11 immigrant detention regime and the broader history of the racist prisonindustrial complex in the United States offers not only analytic clarity but a greater
understanding of that which intervention requires. Contesting structural racism requires
intervening at the meeting points of proximate political institutions, such as immigration policy
and the regime of mass incarceration, with the goal of unraveling deep historical inequities
through legal and political challenges to inequality.
In 2017, the religion clauses of the Constitution offer potential for contestation of the
juridical regime of the anti-Muslim Trump administration. The securitization of all Muslims, of
which I have explored pieces here, writes Muslim immigrants as sites of risk in the language of
counter-terrorism. While I do not mean to suggest that Washington and Hawaii represent a rubric
for some sort of de-securitization or an undoing of Islamophobic rhetoric, these court cases
might indeed provide an example for opportunity to halt further securitization. In invoking the
Establishment Clause, Washington and Hawaii assert the Constitutional rights of all Muslims,
not just U.S. citizens, as agents under a rule of law that cannot enact broad religious mandates.
Religious discourse brings about policies that rely on racialization and racial profiling:
operationalizing religious discourse in the courts may also offer the opportunity for intervention
by leveraging the Constitutional privileging of religion in the service of those marginalized and
oppressed by the state. Ultimately, these judicial contestations to the Trump executive orders
might present a crucial point of intervention in the language that binds Islam and immigration in
the state of exception.
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